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Treason in the Age of Terrorism:
An Explanation and Evaluation of
Treason's Return in Democratic
States
Kristen E. Eichensehr*

ABSTRACT

Treason is an ancient crime, but it fell into disuse in most
Western democratic states after World War I. Now it is making
a comeback with prosecutions or threatened prosecutions
against a new type of enemy-accused terrorists-inthe United
States, the United Kingdom, and Israel. In the postwar period,
commentators wrongly argued that treason would no longer be
prosecuted because it is antiliberal, too difficult to prove,
unnecessary because modern democracies are stable and secure,
and premised on an extinct sense of loyalty to the state. This
Article begins by debunking these claims and explaining
treason's recent reappearance. First, democratic states have
altered their treason laws, without explicit amendment, to make
them akin to other criminal laws. Second, technology has made
treason both easier to detect and easier to prove. Third,
although the states discussed in this Article are generally stable
and secure, states are likely to employ treason prosecutions
when they perceive an existential threat (even if one does not
actually exist). Finally, the betrayal inherent in treason retains
both its power to injure and its power to offend, giving treason
as much indignantpunch as it has ever had. Treason's return
is thus explainable, but is it a cause for concern? Treason
prosecutions may have several potential benefits including
reinforcing societal identity and unity, deterring future
treasons, providing retribution against the traitor, and
clarifying the procedural system under which terrorism should
be addressed. But they may also pose dangers, including

* J.D., Yale Law School. The Author thanks Raechel Anglin, Owen Fiss, Alex
Potapov, David Pozen, Richard R6, W. Michael Reisman, James Whitman, and David
Zionts for helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts. All opinions and any
errors or omissions are the Author's alone.

1443

1444

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:1443

unduly aggrandizing the threat from terrorism, signaling
weakness of the government that chooses to prosecute treason,
biasing the criminal case against the defendant, and posing a
difficult question about whether treason necessarily deserves the
death penalty. Based on a weighing of these factors, this Article
concludes by arguing that treasonprosecutions are not cause for
concern when they are confined to instances in which-like the
U.S., British, and Israeli cases discussed in this Article-the
threat posed by the terroristgroup the traitorsupports is akin to
that posed by an enemy state.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Treason is both an ancient crime and a popular epithet.1 The
United States and the United Kingdom prosecuted treason until

1.

See, e.g., ANN COULTER, TREASON: LIBERAL TREACHERY FROM THE COLD

WAR TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 1 (2003); Paul Krugman, Betraying the Planet, N.Y.
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World War II and its immediate aftermath, but they then seemed to
take a hiatus. The disappearance of treason as a prosecuted crime
led to speculation that liberal democratic states would no longer
Commentators argued that the crime was
prosecute treason.
antiliberal, too difficult to prove, unnecessary in times of stability and
security, and based on a sense of loyalty to the state that has become
extinct in the modern era. These assumptions are being challenged
now, however, by a treason indictment in the United States against
an Al Qaeda propagandist 2 and by suggestions that the crime should
3
be charged against various terrorist-related individuals in Britain.
Israel, which adopted a treason law after World War II, when the
crime was entering a period of disuse elsewhere, is now considering a
treason prosecution against an Arab-Israeli member of the Knesset
4
who is accused of aiding Hezbollah during its 2006 war with Israel.
Using the recent cases, this Article first explores the reasons
commentators gave for treason's disappearance in the United States
and United Kingdom and explains why the reasons and the
assumptions on which they were based were erroneous. Part II
provides an overview of the historic development of treason law, with
particular focus on twentieth-century cases and current treason
investigations. Part III debunks four reasons given for treason's
supposed demise: that the crime is antiliberal, too difficult to prove,
unnecessary for secure and stable states, and premised on an extinct
conception of loyalty. First, this Article argues that states have
adjusted their treason laws to conform to liberal conceptions of crime
and that this has occurred even in the United States where judicial
interpretation rather than statutory amendment effected the change.
Second, it explains that while treason was designed to be difficult to
prove, technology has fostered new and easier ways to prove types of
treason and facilitated the acquisition of evidence for all treason
prosecutions. Third, it argues that states' willingness and desire to
prosecute treason depends not just on the magnitude of the threat
posed by an enemy but on the perceived nature of the threat, namely
whether the threat is conceived of as existential. The current
terrorist threats faced by the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Israel are of a magnitude or nature as to create sufficient insecurity
to prompt treason prosecutions. Part III concludes by arguing that
the betrayal underlying treason retains both its power to injure and
its power to offend, making treason as offensive as ever.

at
A21,
available at http://www.nytimes.coml
29, 2009,
TIMES, June
2009/06/29/opinion29krugman.html?_r=l (calling climate change denial "a form of
treason" and accusing Congressmen who opposed a climate change bill to regulate
greenhouse gases of "treason against the planet").
2.
See infra text accompanying notes 92-104.
See infra text accompanying notes 105-13.
3.
See infra text accompanying notes 114-18.
4.
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Part IV develops a framework for evaluating potential benefits
and dangers of treason prosecutions. Potential benefits from treason
prosecutions may include reinforcing the societal unity of the
prosecuting state by emphasizing the existence and identity of a
threatening "other,"5 deterring future treasons, providing satisfying
retribution against the traitor, and clarifying the procedural system
that should apply to at least some terrorists.
These benefits,
however, must be weighed against dangers from the prosecutions,
including unjustifiably aggrandizing the threat from a terrorist
group, signaling weakness on the part of the prosecuting government
and state, biasing the adjudication of the charges against the traitor
defendant, and presenting a difficult question of whether the death
penalty-the historic punishment for treason-is appropriate for
treasons that did not result in death.
Applying this framework, this Article concludes that the major
concern in evaluating a potential treason prosecution should be
whether the terrorist group the traitor supports poses a state-like
threat. If the terrorist group poses a state-like threat, then there is
little risk of unduly dignifying the group, and the state stands to
benefit from the prosecution by the increased social cohesion,
deterrence, and retribution it will occasion. The current treason
prosecutions are not cause for concern because the terrorist groups
they involve do pose state-like threats to the prosecuting countries.
The existence of a state-like threat as a precondition to a treason
prosecution serves as a principled limit to the expansion of treason
beyond the traditional state-against-state war context. Societies
must scrupulously guard, however, against expansion of treason to
lesser threats-threats by non-state actors in non-war contextsbecause such extension could endanger both the liberal and
democratic aspects of the prosecuting states.

5.
Whether reinforcing societal identity is a benefit depends on whether the
enemy is properly and clearly defined to include only members of the threatening
terrorist organization-and to exclude loyal individuals who may share ethnic, racial,
or religious characteristics with the organization's members. If construed too broadly,
the identification of an enemy could pose significant dangers to minority groups. See
infra Part IV.A.
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II. TREASON'S
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DEVELOPMENT AND ITS APPLICATION TO TERRORISM

A. HistoricalOrigins of Treason in Common Law Countries
In 1351, during the reign of Edward III, England enacted the
Treason Act, known as 25 Edward 111.6 Originally written in
Norman-French, the Act, as translated, reads in relevant part:
Item, whereas divers opinions have been before this time in what case
treason shall be said, and in what not; the King, at the request of the
Lords and of the Commons, hath made a declaration in the manner as
hereafter followeth, that is to say; When a man doth compass or
imagine the death of our Lord the King, or of our Lady his Queen or of
their eldest son and heir; or if a man do levy war against our Lord the
King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm,
giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere, and thereof
be probably attainted of open deed by the people of their condition: ....
And it is to be understood, that in the cases above rehearsed, that ought
to be adjudged treason which extends to our Lord the King, and his
royal majesty: and of such treason the forfeiture of the escheats
pertaineth to our Sovereign Lord, as well of the lands and tenements
holden of other, as of himself... .7

The Act was intended to rein in expansive uses of treason.8 In later
centuries, however, debate arose as to whether 25 Edward III
presented an exhaustive list of every act that could be considered
9
treason.
The Tudor monarchs took the view that the treason statute was
not exhaustive, and they dramatically expanded treason's scope. 10
For example, King Henry VIII passed a treasonable words statute in

6.
Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. III, c. 2, stat. 5 (Eng.).
7.
R v. Casement, [1917] 1 K.B. 98, 98-99 (U.K.) (providing a translation of
the relevant portion of the Treason Act). The King's Bench also quoted the original
Norman-French, which reads, in relevant part:
Auxint prceo q divses opinions ount este einz ces heures qeu cas, qant il avient
doit estre dit treson, & en quel cas noun, le Roi a la requeste des Seignr & de la
Coe, ad fait declarissement q ensuit, cest assavoir; qant home fait compasser ou
ymaginer la mort nre Seignr le Roi, ma dame sa compaigne, ou de lour fitz
primer & heir;. . . . & si home leve de guerre contre nre dit Seignr le Roi en son
Roialme, ou soit aherdantas enemys nre Seignr le Roi en le Roialme, donant a
eux eid ou confort en son Roialme ou p aillours, & de ceo pvablement soit atteint
de ovt faite p gentz de lour condicion: .... [sic] et fait a entendre qen les cases
suisnomez doit estre ajugge treson q sestent a nre Seignr le Roi & a sa roial
majeste; & de tiele mane de treson la forfait e des eschetes apptient a nre Seignr
le Roi, si bien des tres & tenz tenuz des auts, come de lui meismes ....
Id. (quoting Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. III, c. 2, stat. 5 (Eng.)).
D. ALAN ORR, TREASON AND THE STATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN
8.
THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 13 (2002).
9.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16-28.
10.
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1534,11 which prohibited, among other things, harming the king by
calling him a "Heretick, Schismatic, Tyrant, Infidel or Usurper of the
Crown. '12 One commentator notes that the treasonable words statute
"remains to this day a candidate for the most unpopular act ever
passed by parliament in England. ''13 The contours of treason ebbed
and flowed with the relative power and weakness of various
monarchs, but the same basic law of treason continued after the 1649
death of King Charles I, 1 4 who was himself executed for treason on
the grounds that he had levied war against the "Parliament and
Kingdom."15
In the United States, most colonial treason laws were inspired by
and drew on 25 Edward 111.16 Eminent treason scholar Willard
Hurst 17 notes that legislation similar to or incorporating elements of
25 Edward III was found in Delaware, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and "possibly"
Virginia.' 8 The colonial treason legislation also adopted procedural
guarantees, including the requirement of two witnesses to the same
treason, contained in a later English statute, 7 William III. 19 After
the Revolution, the colonial treason legislation gave way to the
Treason Clause in the Constitution. As Hurst describes the nature of
the pre- and post-Revolutionary War laws,
[t]he striking characteristic of all of the pre-Revolutionary legislation in
the colonies is the evident emphasis on the safety of the state or
government, and the subordinate role of any concern for the liberties of
the individual. Whereas the outstanding feature of the treason clause
placed in the Constitution of the United States is that it is on its face

11.
12.
(Eng.)).
13.
14.

Treason Act, 1534, 26 Hen. VII, c. 13 (Eng.).
ORR, supra note 8, at 18-19 (quoting Treason Act, 1534, 26 Hen. VII, c. 13
Id.
Id. at 56.

Usurpation of sovereign power remained treasonable in both a republic and in
a frankly absolutist state in which all the rights of sovereignty were held
exclusively by the prince ....
Whatever the precise nature of the regimearistocratic, monarchic, or democratic-the claimants of sovereign power
needed the law of treason in order to advance their claims to govern.
Id.
15.
For an account of the trial of King Charles I, see C.G.L. DU CANN, ENGLISH
TREASON TRIALS 161-73 (1964).
16.
Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States (pt. 1), 58 HARV. L. REV. 226,
229-32 (1944); see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 44 (1993) (noting that "[t]he archaic language of this statute
bequeathed the terminology of treason to the entire English-speaking world.").
17.
See infra text accompanying notes 78-83.
18.
Hurst, supra note 16, at 232.
19.
Id. at 244-45.
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20
legislation is almost wholly affirmative.
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the emphasis of colonial

The Constitution carefully limits treason's scope and makes the crime
difficult to prove by adding innovative procedural protections. The
Treason Clause of the U.S. Constitution states:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,
but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
21
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

Treason is the only crime defined in the Constitution-a testament to
its gravity. In the United States, however, the gravity of the crime
has been juxtaposed with the gravity of its abuse. The Supreme
Court has noted that "the basic law of treason in this country was
framed by men who.., were taught by experience and by history to
fear abuse of the treason charge almost as much as they feared
treason itself. '22 The Framers, in drafting the Treason Clause,
"adopted every limitation that the practice of governments had
'23
evolved or that politico-legal philosophy to that time had advanced.
In addition, they
added two of their own which had no precedent. They wrote into the
organic act of the new government a prohibition of legislative or judicial
creation of new treasons. And a venerable safeguard against false
testimony was given a novel application by requiring two witnesses to
24
the same overt act.

The Framers intended the procedural safeguards to make treason
more difficult to prove and thereby to serve as an assurance of the
rectitude of convictions.
The Framers were careful to limit treason to two types of acts:
(1) giving aid and comfort to an enemy of the United States; and (2)
levying war against the United States. 25 Both of these were included

20.
Id. at 235.
21.
U.S. CONST.art. III, § 3.
22.
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 21 (1945).
23.
Id. at 23-24.
24.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added). The prior English law had required two
witnesses, but only in general, not to the same overt act. See supra text accompanying
note 20.
25.
See, e.g., Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1943) (finding
that the Constitution's definition of treason was meant to be "meticulously exclusive"
and not open to definition of additional treasons); United States v. Burgman, 87 F.
Supp. 568, 569-70 (D.D.C. 1949) ('Thus, there are only two types of treason against the
United States: first, levying war against the United States; and second, adhering to
their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.").
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in 25 Edward 111.26 The statutory definition of treason tracks the
27
Treason Clause in identifying two-and only two-types of treason.
The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2381, states, "Whoever, owing allegiance to
the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or
elsewhere, is guilty of treason ....,"28 The treason statute prescribed
death as the sole punishment for treason until Congress amended it
in 1862 to allow imprisonment of "not less than five years" and a fine
of "not less than $10,000."29
The English treason statute was exported not only to the United
States but also to Palestine under the British Mandate. A 1943
compilation of the criminal laws in the Palestinian Mandate-laws
that were then adopted by the state of Israel after its declaration of
independence 3 0 -lists treason as "levying war against His Majesty or
31
It
conspiring to levy such war," for which the punishment is death.
further defines a "treasonable felony," for which the punishment is
life imprisonment, as "[m]anifesting by an overt act the intention to
effect (or publishing such an intention) - (a) the deposition of His
Majesty, or (b) the levying of war against His Majesty, or (c) the

26.
See supratext accompanying note 7.
27.
18 U.S.C.S. § 2381 (LexisNexis 2009).
28.
Id.
29.
Id. (specifying that an individual who is guilty of treason "shall suffer
death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not
less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United
States"); David K. Watson, The Trial of Jefferson Davis: An Interesting Constitutional
Question, 24 YALE L.J. 669, 675 (1915) (chronicling the history of the treason statute
and explaining that Congress allegedly amended the punishment at the urging of
President Lincoln who often received petitions to pardon convicted traitors because of
their youth and did not believe that such convicts should be sentenced to death).
30.
See Provisional Council of State, Law and Administration Ordinance, No. 1
of 5708 (May 14, 1948), § 11 (Isr.).
The law which existed in Palestine on the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948) shall
remain in force, in so far as there is nothing therein repugnant to this
Ordinance or to the other laws which may be enacted by or on behalf of the
Provisional Council of State, and subject to such modifications as may result
from the establishment of the State and its authorities.
Id.; see also Norman Bentwich, The Legal System of Israel, 13 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 236,
236 (1964) (describing Israeli law as a combination of "Ottomon, Moslem, French,
Jewish and, above all, English" laws); Uri Yadin, Sources and Tendencies of Israeli
Law, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1951) (noting that the mandatory law present in
Palestine and adopted by Israel "includes a great number of Ordinances, mostly based
upon English law and many of them almost identical with corresponding Acts of
Parliament" that among other areas, "cover the whole ground of criminal law, [and]
criminal and civil procedure," and explaining that with only a few exceptions, "the
Israel legislature took over holus bolus what the law was in Palestine on the eve of the
Mandate").
31.
E. D. GORDON, A CODE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF PALESTINE: A
COMPILATION OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW 35 (1943).

2009]

TREASON IN THEAGE OF TERRORISM

instigation of an armed invasion of His Majesty's dominions. '3 2 The
Israeli Supreme Court in the 1950s reinterpreted the treason
provision in light of a 1948 ordinance adopting the mandatory laws
subject to "such modifications as may result from the establishment
of the State and its authorities. '33 The Court noted that "[i]n the
place of His Majesty as the sovereign (and the enemy in a war), there
now comes the State of Israel, ' 34 but the Court otherwise preserved
the "essential nature" of the crime. 35 Israel's current treason law is
codified in Article 99(a) of the Criminal Code, which states, "If a
person with intent to assist an enemy in war against Israel commits
an act calculated to do so, he is liable to the death penalty or to life
36
imprisonment.
Thus, 25 Edward III remains on the books as the British law of
treason, and the constitutional clause inspired by the 1351 statute
continues to serve as the basis for treason prosecutions in the United
States. Israel's treason prohibition derives from the same British
law. The ancient nature of the crime and its statutory definitions

32.
Id. (footnote omitted).
33.
CrimA 44/52 Diab v. Attorney-General [1959] IsrSC 6, 922 at para. 10 n. 1
(Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.illfiles-eng/52/440/000/ ZO1/52000440.zOl.pdf.
34.
Id. at para. 10.
35.
Id. The Court's full discussion of the mandatory language and its alteration
to accommodate the establishment of the Israeli state is as follows:
I am inclined to think that if an Israel resident, owing allegiance to the State,
takes part in a war against the State of Israel, he may be charged with treason
and brought to trial under section 49(1) of the Criminal Code Ordinance. This
section, in its Mandatory form, imposes the death sentence on 'any person who
levies war against His Majesty in order to intimidate or overawe the High
Commissioner'. In the place of His Majesty as the sovereign (and the enemy in
a war), there now comes the State of Israel, and instead of the High
Commissioner as the Governing Authority (and as the object in the war), there
comes the Government of Israel. They are, on any reckoning, 'modifications as
may result from the establishment of the State and its authority', within the
meaning of section 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, and
they also alter the content of section 49(1), while preserving its essential
nature, namely, the prohibition of war against the sovereign, with the object of
deposing the Government of the State or of intimidating it. That being so, it
seems to me prima facie that we may alter the wording of that section so that it
will henceforth read: 'Any person who levies war against the State of Israel in
order to intimidate or overawe the Government of Israel is guilty of treason and
is liable to the punishment of death.' The outcome will be that if the act is
done, as in the present case, by an Israel resident owing allegiance to the State
and who does not, therefore, enjoy the defence or exemption deriving from the
principles of International Law (namely, that in the absence of a duty of
allegiance he cannot be guilty of treason, he may be charged with treason and
tried according to section 49(1) of the Criminal Code Ordinance.
Id. (citations omitted).
36.
Dan Izenberg, et al., BisharaSuspected of Aiding Enemy During War; MKs
Now Call for Bringing Former Balad Head to Justice for Treason, JERUSALEM POST,
Apr. 26, 2007, at 1 (quoting CRIM. CODE art. 99(a) (Isr.)).
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have complicated, but not prevented, treason charges in these
countries.
B. Treason in the World Wars and Its Subsequent Disappearance
In the twentieth century, instances of treason in the United
States and the United Kingdom centered on the First and Second
World Wars. This subpart lays out the cases in some detail so that
the following subpart can contrast them with the current treason
prosecution and considered prosecutions.
The most famous World War I treason prosecution was that of
Roger Casement, who was charged with and convicted of providing
aid and comfort to Germany. 37 Casement, a British citizen but an
Irish nationalist, attempted to convince British prisoners of war in
Germany to join an Irish brigade that he was forming, with German
support, to fight for Irish independence.3 8 In April 1916, Casement,
sans brigade, traveled to Ireland via a German U-boat, carrying with
him arms and ammunition for use in the fight against the British for
Irish independence. 39
Casement was charged with treason by
adhering to the King's enemies based on six overt acts-five relating
to his attempts to recruit the Irish Brigade and one due to his
41
"invasion" of Ireland. 40 He was convicted and hanged.
The best-known British treason prosecution stemming from
World War II was that of William Joyce, who broadcast radio
''4 2
propaganda for the Nazis under the moniker "Lord Haw-Haw.
Joyce was actually an American citizen, born in the United States in
1906 to naturalized U.S. citizens.4 3 He moved to Ireland when he
was three years old and to England when he was fifteen. 44 In 1933,
45
Joyce applied for a British passport, claiming to be a British citizen.
He continued to renew the British passport through August 1939, and
the renewal was granted through July 1940.46 During the period
when his British passport was valid, Joyce broadcast Nazi radio
propaganda. 47 In examining the charge that Joyce had provided aid

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

R v. Casement, [1917] 1 K.B. 98, 98-99 (U.K.).
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101; accord DU CANN, supra note 15, at 229-30.
DU CANN, supranote 15, at 232.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 246.
Joyce v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347, 348 (H.L.) (U.K.).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 348-49.
See Du CANN, supra note 15, at 248.

Several times a day, from the autumn of 1939 to the spring of 1945, that
distinctive and insistent voice, beginning its pronouncements with the words
'Germany calling'-he pronounced it 'Jairmany', probably designed to attract
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and comfort to Germany, 48 British courts focused on the issue of
allegiance-particularly whether it extended to Joyce once the court
realized that he was not a British citizen.
Under common law, aliens in Britain owe a duty of allegiance for
the time that they are present in Britain and under the king's (or
later, the government's) protection. 49 This principle was established
in 1608 in Calvin's Case, when a British court held that in addition to
the natural or permanent allegiance owed by a natural-born subject,
an "alien that is in amity [who] cometh into England, because as long
as he is within England, he is within the King's protection [and]
therefore so long as he is here, ... oweth unto the King a local
obedience or ligeance .... 5o The House of Lords in Joyce's case
extended this duty of local allegiance to Joyce after his departure
from England because of his British passport. The opinion of Lord
Jowitt explains, "The question is ... whether by [the passport's]
receipt he extended his duty of allegiance beyond the moment when
he left the shores of this country. As one owing allegiance to the King
he sought and obtained the protection of the King for himself while
abroad."'51 Lord Jowitt also noted that "the special value to the
enemy of [Joyce's] services as a broadcaster was that he could be
represented as speaking as a British subject and his German work
book showed that it was in this character that he was employed, for
which his passport was doubtless accepted as the voucher. '52 The
House of Lords upheld Joyce's conviction for treason for providing aid
54
and comfort to Germany, 53 and he was hanged on January 3, 1946.
In the United States, treason prosecutions last occurred during
and following World War 11.55 Two treason prosecutions were
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. In Cramer v.

initial attention was a feature of English life in wartime. It gave news-which
might be true or false or a compound of both-and views which were heavily
pro-Axis. The quality of the exposition varied from brilliance to ineptitude; it
might arouse anger, contempt, amusement or disbelief but, at any rate, it was
listened to.
Id.; Joyce, [1946] A.C. at 349 ("It was proved by uncontradicted evidence that he had,
between September 3, 1939, and December 10, 1939, broadcast propaganda on behalf
of the enemy.").
48.
Joyce, [1946] A.C. at 348.
49.
Id. at 366-70.
50.
Calvin's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 383 (K.B.). For discussion of this
case and its conception of allegiance and the state, see ORR, supra note 8, at 49-50.
51.
Joyce, [1946] A.C. at 370.
52.
Id. at 371-72.
53.
Id. at 347.
54.
See Cameron Simpson, Terror Suspect Arrested After Extradition from
Zambia; Extremists Could Face Treason Charges, HERALD (Glasgow), Aug. 8, 2005, at
4.
55.
See infra note 74.
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United States,5 6 the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of an
associate of the Quirin saboteurs. 57 The government had charged
Cramer, a naturalized citizen, with treason for providing aid and
comfort to the Quirin saboteurs, one of whom, Werner Thiel, was a
58
friend of Cramer's from the time that both had lived in New York.
Cramer knew that Thiel supported the Nazis and had gone to
Germany, but he did not know in advance of Thiel's return to the
United States or of Thiel's sabotage mission.5 9 Cramer met with
Thiel and his saboteur partner to eat and drink, and Cramer
apparently agreed to hold money for Thiel (a charge later withdrawn
from the jury due to lack of evidence 6 ) and to arrange for Thiel's
fianc6e to meet them. 61 Cramer admitted that he suspected that
Thiel had arrived by submarine from Germany, but he denied
knowledge of Thiel's sabotage mission.6 2 After their second meeting,
the men were arrested.6 3 The Court explained, "The very minimum
function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is
that it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain
a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the
enemy." 64 Following the Treason Clause, the Court further noted,
"Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two
witnesses."65 Applying these legal standards to Cramer's case, the
Court held that the alleged overt act was insufficient to constitute
treason, given that there was no proof that Cramer "gave them
information or established any 'contact' for them with any person
other than an attempt to bring about a rendezvous between Thiel and
a girl, or that being 'seen in public with a citizen above suspicion' was
of any assistance to the enemy. ' 66 In fact, "[m]eeting with Cramer in
public drinking places to tipple and trifle was no part of the
saboteurs' mission and did not advance it. It may well have been a
digression which jeopardized its success. '6 7 Thus, the Court set a
high bar for what constitutes an overt act of aid and comfort 68 and
reversed Cramer's conviction.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942).
Cramer, 325 U.S. at 3-4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 38.
Id.
See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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In the other World War II case decided by the Supreme Court,
Haupt v. United States, the Court upheld the treason conviction of the
father of one of the other Quirin saboteurs. 69 Max Haupt was
charged with treason for providing aid and comfort to his son,
Herbert Haupt, with knowledge of his son's sabotage mission on
behalf of Germany. 70 The Court held, "[T]here can be no question
that sheltering, or helping to buy a car, or helping to get employment
is helpful to an enemy agent, that they were of aid and comfort to
Herbert Haupt in his mission of sabotage."' 71 The Court noted that
these actions had "the unmistakable quality which was found lacking
in the Cramer case of forwarding the saboteur in his mission. '72 The
Court affirmed Haupt's conviction, rejecting the argument that Max
Haupt acted only with parental solicitude and should be acquitted on
73
that basis.
Although no other treason cases reached the Supreme Court, the
lower federal courts decided several others, all of which affirmed
convictions of treason by adhering and giving aid and comfort to U.S.
enemies. 74 Other than the two Quirin-saboteur-related cases decided
by the Supreme Court and one Ninth Circuit case regarding a U.S.
75
citizen who abused U.S. prisoners of war while employed by Japan,
the treason cases all affirmed treason convictions of U.S. citizens who
acted as propagandists for Germany or Japan. The propagandist
cases are important for several reasons. First, they are the most
recent treason prosecutions and convictions in the United States, and
they were the first treason prosecutions of propagandists. Second,
they establish a commonality between the U.S. and U.K. laws of
treason, as Britain used the same "aid and comfort" theory to
prosecute William Joyce for his propaganda broadcasts.7 6 Finally,
the example of the World War II propagandists and the precedents
that courts developed to deal with their treasonous acts facilitated
the most recent and only post-World War II treason indictment in the
United States, the 2006 indictment of U.S. citizen Adam Gadahn,
77
who appears in propaganda videos for Al Qaeda.

69.
Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 644 (1947).
70.
Id. at 634-35.
71.
Id. at 635.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 641-42.
74.
See D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951); Kawakita v.
United States, 190 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1951); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st
Cir. 1950); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United
States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948); United States v. Burgman, 87 F. Supp. 568
(D.D.C. 1949).
75.
Kawakita, 190 F.2d at 520-21.
76.
Joyce v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347, 348 (H.L.) (U.K.).
77.
See infra Part III.C.
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treason faded from

prominence.
Commentators both at the time and since have
predicted that treason prosecutions had become obsolete and would
no longer be brought. Authoritative U.S. commentator James Willard
Hurst compiled a historic appendix on English and U.S. treason law
on behalf of the Department of Justice to support the Solicitor

General's brief in Cramer.78

Hurst then published his amended

historical appendix in a series of law review articles in 1944 and
1945. 79
In the final article,80 Hurst critiqued the Cramer case,
particularly its analysis of the requirement that the overt act actually
aid the enemy 8 l and evidence intent.8 2 He concluded that the Court's
opinion in Cramer "cast such a net of ambiguous limitations about the
crime of 'treason' that it is doubtful whether a careful prosecutor will
ever again chance an indictment under that head," and "[t]he
uncertain meaning of the decision will alone be as strong a deterrent
as any doctrine elicited from it. ' '83 From the British perspective,
Dame Rebecca West, who chronicled the treason trial of William
Joyce for the New Yorker, published her observations about Joyce and
other traitors and spies in a 1949 book entitled The Meaning of
Treason.8 4 West titled part four of the book "The Decline and Fall of
Treason. '8 5 The declining focus on treason in the postwar period is
also evidenced by the declining coverage the crime has received in
86
criminal law treatises during the same period.

78.

See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES:

COLLECTED ESSAYS, at vii (1971) (explaining the origin of Hurst's assignment and of
the book, which is a compilation of the law review articles that were published at the
end of WWII).
79.
The three articles published by Hurst were all titled Treason in the United
States. See Hurst supra note 16; Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States (pt. 2), 58
HARv. L. REV. 395 (1945) [hereinafter Treason-Part 1]; Willard Hurst, Treason in the
United States (pt. 3), 58 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1945) [hereinafter Treason-PartIll].
80.
Treason Part III, supra note 79.
81.
Id. at 837 ("To wait for aid to be 'actually' given the enemy risks
stultification: the treason may be successful to the point at which there will no longer
be a sovereign to punish it.").
82.
Id. at 845.
Certainly there is no sound basis in English or American history to require that
the overt act be such as to evidence the intent .... The Constitution in its
terms requires only the testimony of two witnesses to an 'act,' not to the effect
of that act.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
REBECCA WEST, THE MEANING OF TREASON 9 (rev. ed. 1965).
85.
Id.
86.
The Author's investigations show that treason received several pages of
coverage in treatises in the early 1900s, declining to several paragraphs in the
interwar period, a paragraph in the post-World War II period, and no mention at all in
current treatises.
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The few commentators who have worked on treason in the
intervening period have confirmed treason's decline. In 1982, George
Fletcher wrote, "History, venerable statutes, our own Constitution
and prominent cases-all of these sources testify to the significance of
treason in the structure of our criminal law. Yet our casebooks and
textbooks totally ignore these materials. '8 7 As recently as 2004,
Fletcher predicted, "For various reasons the government will
probably not bring another treason prosecution for many years to
come, if ever. '8 8 A 2006 article on the topic is entitled "The Forgotten
Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant
Problem. '89 The persistent predictions of treason's demise were,
however, premature.
C. Current Treason Cases and Potential Cases
In October 2006, the United States issued its first indictment for
treason since World War 11.90 Treason charges have been at least
bandied about for various terrorist-linked figures in Britain as well,
and Israel is considering a treason prosecution against an ArabIsraeli lawmaker for allegedly providing targeting information to
Hezbollah during its 2006 conflict with Israel. 91 These actual or
considered treason charges against individuals because of their links
with terrorism signal renewed interest in treason and a possible
expansion and reconceptualization of the crime to extend to the
provision of aid to terrorist organizations-a departure from the
enemy-state-based treasons of the World War era.

87.
George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 193, 194 (1982)
[hereinafter The Case for Treason].
88.
George P. Fletcher, Law, Loyalty, and Treason: How Can the Law Regulate
Loyalty Without Imperiling It?: Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611, 1627
(2004) [hereinafter Law, Loyalty, and Treason]; see also id. at 1619.
In the literature of criminal law, treason was always considered something of
an 'outlier.' However central it might have been to the interests of the state, it
was never taken to be the paradigmatic offense for understanding the general
elements of criminal liability (harm, actus reus, mens rea). Casebooks ignore
the offense. Treatise writers show little interest. The tendency to ignore
treason in theorizing about criminal law testifies to its atavistic character.

Id.
89.
Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten ConstitutionalLaw of Treason and the
Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863 (2006) (confirming the "forgotten"
nature of treason, but arguing that it could be applied in some enemy combatant
cases).
90.
See First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Adam Gadahn a.k.a.
Azzam al-Amriki, SA CR 05-254(A) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/adam-indictment.pdf [hereinafter Indictment of
Adam Gadahn].
91.
See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
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The U.S. treason indictment was issued by a grand jury in the
Central District of California against Adam Gadahn, a U.S. citizen,
for appearing in several Al Qaeda propaganda videos. 92 The Gadahn
indictment is very similar to the treason prosecutions of
propagandists in World War Il-prosecution under the aid-andcomfort prong for producing enemy propaganda-but it is the first in
the United States to allege that a terrorist organization can be
considered an enemy for the purposes of treason. The indictment
alleges that Gadahn, "owing allegiance to the United States,
knowingly adhered to an enemy of the United States, namely, alQaeda, and gave al-Qaeda aid and comfort, within the United States
and elsewhere, with intent to betray the United States. ''93 The
indictment sets the stage for the allegation of the offense by noting
that Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization designated by the U.S.
Secretary of State; 94 that Al Qaeda took credit for the 9/11 attacks on
the United States and the July 7, 2005, subway bombings in
London; 95 and that the U.S. Congress passed a resolution (the
Authorization for Use of Military Force 96) on September 18, 2001,
authorizing the U.S. President to use "all necessary and appropriate
97
force against those responsible" for the 9/11 attacks.
The listed overt acts "witnessed by two or more witnesses"
include "appear[ing] in" specific Al Qaeda videos and speaking in each
video. 98 For example, in a September 2, 2006, video, Ayman alZawahiri appeared and "introduced Gadahn as 'our brother Azzam
the American,"' and Gadahn stated, specifically addressing U.S.
troops fighting in Afghanistan, "You know you're considered ... as
nothing more than expendable cannon fodder, a means to an end,"
and, "Escape from the unbelieving army and join the winning side." 99
The indictment alleges five overt acts, "appear[ing] in" five Al Qaeda
videos.' 0 0
In the press conference announcing the Gadahn
indictment, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty acknowledged
that there was no evidence that Gadahn participated in any of the
terrorist attacks of which he warned' ° 1 but emphasized that "[tihe
significance of the propaganda part should not be underestimated....

92.
Indictment of Adam Gadahn, supra note 90, para. 8.
93.
Id. para. 8.
94.
Id. para. 1.
95.
Id. paras. 4, 7.
96.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I) (2001)).
97.
Indictment of Adam Gadahn, supra note 90, para.5.
98.
Id. para. 8.
99.
Id.
100.

Id.

101.
Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Indictment of U.S. Citizen for Treason and
Material Support Charges for Providing Aid and Comfort to al Qaeda (Oct. 11, 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag-speech-061011.htm.
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[T]his is a very significant piece of the way an enemy does business,
to demoralize the troops, to encourage the spread of fear." 10 2 Since
the indictment was issued, Gadahn has appeared in at least four
more videos, including one in January 2008 when he tore up his U.S.
passport and called for attacks on President Bush during the
President's visit to the Middle East. 10 3 The continuing priority the
U.S. government places on capturing Gadahn is evidenced by
Gadahn's inclusion with thirty-eight others as a "Wanted Terrorist"
on the government's Rewards for Justice website, which offers "up to"
10 4
a "$1 million reward" for information about Gadahn.
In the United Kingdom, treason prosecutions have been
considered for several terrorism suspects.
Soon after the 9/11
attacks, Home Office Minister Lord Rooker told the House of Lords
that Britons who fought for the Taliban would be prosecuted for
treason.' 0 5 The issue then arose when it became clear that the
United States was detaining several British citizens at Guantanamo
Bay. The British press and members of Parliament called for them to
be repatriated to Britain and prosecuted, possibly for treason. 10 6 As
the prisoners' return to Britain approached, however, the practical
difficulties of proving treason became obvious, though the possibility
of a treason charge was still considered.' 0 7
The press and

102.

Id.

103.
Al Qaeda Spokesman Urges Attacks on Bush, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 2008, at 9;
see Perry Chiaramonte, NYPD on the Alert for Qaeda 'Bomb'; Teams Hit Streets After
'Net Chatter, N.Y. POST, Aug. 11, 2007, at 4 (describing Gadahn video threatening U.S.
embassies); James Gordon Meek, Al Qaeda Warns U.S. of New Horrors,DAILY NEWS
(New York), May 30, 2007, at 19 (describing a May 2007 Gadahn A1-Qaeda video);
Hadeel Al-shalchi, Al-Qaida Video Suggests Crisis Is Proof of Defeat, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS (Mich.), Oct. 5, 2008, at A3 (describing video in which Gadahn "taunted
Americans over their economic crisis," and blamed the economic problems on the U.S.
actions in Afghanistan and Iraq). The indictment may have been updated to include
these more recent videos, but an updated version, if it exists, has not been released.
The indictment also charges Gadahn under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B with providing material
support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. Indictment of Adam Gadahn,
supra note 90, at 9.
104.
Rewards for Justice: Seeking Information Against International Terrorism,
http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=wanted-terrorist&language=english
(last visited Oct. 18, 2009) (listing Gadahn and thirty-eight other wanted terrorists);
see also Rewards for Justice-Gadahn; http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?
page=gadahn&language=english (last visited Oct. 18, 2009) (describing Gadahn and
the one million dollar reward). The Author became aware of the program-and its
inclusion of Gadahn-while viewing a "Rewards for Justice" poster in an airport
security line.
105.
Ian Burrell, Volunteers for Taliban Face Trial for Treason, INDEPENDENT
(London), Oct. 31, 2001, at 5.
106.
See Colin Brown, Campaign Against Terror: MPs Want Captives Flown to
UK, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 20, 2002, at 2; Simon Heffer, Commentary, Why They
Must Be Tried for Treason in Britain,DAILY MAIL (London), Jan. 16, 2002, at 13.
107.
See Bob Sherwood, Five 'Unlikely To Face Trial on Return, FIN. TIMES
(London), Feb. 20, 2004, at 3 (quoting Shadow Home Secretary David Davis stating his
belief that there "may be a case for treason" if the "US provides the UK authorities
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government officials, implicitly criticizing the United States, noted
that "[i]t is unlikely that any admissions or confessions made by the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay would be admissible in an English
court, given the decision of the US authorities to deny them access to
legal advice.' 0 8 Although a treason charge would be possible "if
there is evidence that the men, as British nationals, fought against
British troops in Afghanistan,"'1 9 commentators noted that "[f]inding
witnesses to acts in Afghanistan in the chaos of the collapse of the
Taliban regime, and then bringing them to the UK to stand in the Old
Bailey witness box, is also a daunting task." 110
The idea of treason charges was also bandied about for Omar
Bakri Mohammed, a Muslim cleric who was the spiritual leader of a
radical Muslim group, the al-Muhajiroun. 111 The cleric allegedly
supported the 7/7 London bombers and was an outspoken supporter
of radical Islam. 112 In August 2005, a month after the 7/7 attacks, he
113
fled to Lebanon, escaping possible charge in Britain.
Thus, Britain has not launched any treason prosecutions against
its repatriated nationals, but given the identified evidentiary
difficulties, it is impossible to know whether the lack of prosecutions
represents merely the result of tainted or inadmissible evidencethat is, that treason could not be proven in court-or the actual belief
of the U.K. Crown Prosecution Service and government that treason
did not occur. Similarly, Bakri Mohammed fled Britain, so it is
impossible to know whether the government would have charged him
with treason had he remained.
Israel is also investigating terrorism-related treason. According
to information released at the end of April and in early May 2007
after the partial lifting of a court gag order, the Israeli government is
investigating whether an Arab-Israeli member of the Knesset, Azmi
Bishara, committed treason by aiding Hezbollah during its summer

with evidence that these people supported or offered comfort to the Taliban or alQaeda").
108.
Joshua Rozenberg, Prosecution in Britain Would Face Difficulties, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), July 11, 2003, at 8; see also John Steele, 'Fog of War' Will Make
Bringing Charges in the UK Difficult, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 20, 2004, at 4
("Legal experts question whether evidence gathered from interviews with the men in
Guantanamo Bay, without legal representation and the safeguards of British
legislation, would be admissible in a British court.").
109.
Steele, supra note 108, at 4.
110.
Id.; see also Rozenberg, supra note 108, at 8 ("It is even less likely that
eyewitnesses could be found to give evidence of events in which they were said to have
taken part before these men were detained."); Steele, supra note 108, at 4 ("Antiterrorist police and prosecutors face major legal and evidential hurdles in forming
terrorist-related charges and in gathering admissible evidence from events that
occurred 'in the fog of the Afghan war."').
111.
Nigel Morris, Radical Cleric Flees Britain After Threat of Treason Trial,
BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Aug. 9, 2005.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
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2006 war with Israel. 114 Bishara is alleged to have violated Article
99(a) of the Criminal Code, entitled "Treason," which states: "If a
person with intent to assist an enemy in war against Israel commits
an act calculated to do so, he is liable to the death penalty or to life
imprisonment."' 15
Specifically, Israeli police accuse Bishara of
receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars from Hezbollah in
exchange for advising the group "on 'how to cause further damage to
Israel' by giving his contacts geographical information and urging
them 'to strike further south than Haifa."' 11 6 In April 2006, Bishara
left Israel and resigned his Knesset seat; he has remained abroad
since that time. 117 Israeli police have warned that Bishara will be
arrested if he returns to Israel. 118 As of this writing, information
about whether Bishara has been formally indicted is not available.
The investigation of Bishara would not be the first treason
prosecution in Israel. Notably, Israel adopted its treason law at its
founding in 194811 9-precisely the time at which the U.S. and U.K.
treason laws were entering disuse. Israel has used its treason law
several times, perhaps most notably in the case of Mordechai
Vanunu, who worked for nine years as a nuclear technician at the
Israeli nuclear research facility at Dimona. 120 Vanunu quit his job in
October 1985 and revealed to a journalist in Australia that he had
taken photographs of the Dimona plant. 121 The information he
provided confirmed that Israel had nuclear armaments and suggested
122
that Israel possessed sufficient plutonium to arm 150 weapons.
Just before the story was scheduled to run in the Sunday Times in
London, a Mossad agent lured Vanunu from London to Rome. 123 In
Rome, he was drugged and taken back to Israel, where he was tried
in secret and convicted of treason. 124 Thus, treason in Bishara's case
is not viewed as the anachronism that it is in the United States and
United Kingdom, but Bishara's case is still a new development
because it involves treason via support of a terrorist group.

114.
See, e.g., Ken Ellingwood, Arab Israeli Is Suspected of Advising Hezbollah,
L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A6; Rory McCarthy, Wanted, for Crimes Against the State,
THE GUARDIAN (London), July 24, 2007, at 12.
115.
Izenberg, et al., supra note 36 (quoting of the CRIM. CODE art. 99(a) (Isr.)).
116.
See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, Israel Reveals New Details of Allegations Against
Ex-Lawmaker, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A10. (quoting police spokesman Micky
Rosenfeld); see also Ellingwood, supra note 114, at A6 (describing Bishara's actions).
117.
Kershner, supra note 116, at A10.
118.
Id.
119.
See supranote 31 and accompanying text.
120.
THE FABER BOOK OF TREACHERY 363 (Nigel West ed., 1995) [hereinafter
FABER].

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363-64.
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The same ancient 1351 statute permeates the current treason
law of the United Kingdom, United States, and Israel, and, in all
three, the old idea of treason is being applied to betrayal in aid of a
new type of enemy: non-state-based terrorist groups. The current
treason cases or possible cases display continuity with cases
throughout the twentieth century but diverge from the older cases
because of the nature of the enemy. The new sort of enemy, however,
serves as a further continuity across countries: Not only do all three
states have similar foundational laws of treason, but they have
turned to the almost obscure crime of treason in the face of terrorist
threats. The reappearance of treason prosecutions discredits the
arguments of those who had claimed that treason was obsolete. The
next Part examines the reasons given in the post-World War II period
and as recently as 2004 for why treason was (allegedly) obsolete and
would not be charged again, and it explains why the disappearance
rationales were erroneous at the time of their exposition and have
now been proven incorrect.

III.

DEBUNKING THE REASONS FOR TREASON'S ALLEGED
DISAPPEARANCE

This Part takes up four major arguments put forward to explain
why treason prosecutions had ceased and shows that each was either
incorrect in its premises or that circumstances have changed
sufficiently such that the argument no longer applies.
A. Antiliberal
Writing from the U.S. perspective, eminent Columbia Law
Professor George Fletcher argues that "because of its feudal origins,
treason no longer conforms to our shared assumptions about the
liberal nature and purpose of criminal law. '125 Fletcher argues that
treason displays two antiliberal facets that are inconsistent with the
"nature and purpose" of criminal law. 126
First, "the crime is
addressed to the bond of loyalty between a particular sovereign and
subordinate subjects. ' 127 Second, the "core of the crime" is not
"external actions," but rather "internal attitudes," namely the
"mental actions of compassing or lusting in one's heart."'128 Fletcher

Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1612.
125.
Id. at 1612, 1621.
126.
Id. at 1621.
127.
Id. Elsewhere, Fletcher explains, "As clothed in the crimes of treason and
128.
adultery, the figure of disloyalty enters where morality generally fears to tread. It
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notes that countries other than the United States have made
"legislative moves" "to convert the offense into a crime with liberal
contours." 129 He identifies two techniques for this conversion. First,
treason can be redefined as a type of espionage, which France has
done. 130 Fletcher explains that in France now, "[flt]he essence of the
crime is betraying state secrets. It is applicable to everyone, but the
term 'treason' is reserved for French citizens who commit
espionage." 13 1 The French penal code defines the acts that constitute
treason/espionage 132 and specifies that the acts "constitute treason
where they are committed by a French national or a soldier in the
service of France, and constitute espionage where they are committed
by any other person. ' 133 Second, treason can be "collapse[d]" into
"disloyalty or sedition toward the established government," which
Fletcher identifies as the German approach. 134 He explains that,
under German law, "[a]nyone, foreigners as well as Germans, can
commit Hochverrat [high treason] by using force or the threat of force
to undermine the Basic Law, the German constitution. 1 35 The
French and German approaches are certainly illustrative of attempts

passes as an external crime, but its essence is in the spirit." FLETCHER, supra note 16,
at 47.
129.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supranote 88, at 1612-13.
130.
Id. at 1623.
131.
Id.
132.
The penal code specifies various actions that constitute treason/espionage
in Articles 411-2 to 411-11, including "[h]anding over troops belonging to the French
armed forces, or all or part of the national territory, to a foreign power, to a foreign
organization or to an organization under foreign control, or to their agents," CODE
PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 411-2 (Fr.), and "[h]anding over equipment, constructions,
installations, or apparatus assigned to the national defence to a foreign power, to a
foreign undertaking or organization or to an enterprise or organization under foreign
control, or to their agents," id. art. 411-3. The punishment for the various types of
treason/espionage varies from life imprisonment and a 750,000 Euro fine, id. art. 4112, downward to thirty years imprisonment and a 450,000 Euro fine, id. art. 411-3, and
below, for example
[d]irect incitement by promises, offers, pressure, threats or violence, to commit
one of the felonies set out in the present Chapter, where the incitement was
ineffective because of circumstances independent of the offender's will, is
punished by seven years imprisonment and a fine of E100,000.
Id. art. 411-11.
133.
Id. art. 411-1.
134.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supranote 88, at 1624.
135.
Id. at 1623, 1624 n.55.
81 StGB (providing that high treason against the Federal Republic is
committed by anyone, anywhere, who 'undertakes' with force or the threat of
force to undermine the constitutional order of Germany); 82 StGB (providing
that treason against a state is committed by anyone, anyplace, who undertakes
with force or the threat of force to undermine the constitutional order of a state
[Bundesland] or to seize part of its territory).
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to make treason a more normal or, in Fletcher's words, more liberal
crime, because they focus inquiry on the perpetrator's actions and
remove the requirement that the perpetrator stand in any particular
relation to the state. But Fletcher ignores the doctrinal moves that
have been made in U.S. treason law as steps toward the same end.
Turning to Fletcher's first antiliberal characteristic of treasonthat the crime is "addressed to the bond of loyalty between a
particular sovereign and subordinate subjects"136-it is not at all
clear why the "relational"'13 7 aspect of treason is antiliberal. Fletcher
notes other "relational" crimes including adultery and child
neglect, 138 but saves his antiliberal or "feudal" label for "cases in
which a subordinate is under special duties of respect and loyalty
toward a superior," which "was true in the history of treason and
partially true in the history of adultery."'139 Though Fletcher's
argument is not fully worked out, 140 his principal claim is that
treason's relational aspect violates the so-called "harm principle" laid
out in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. As Mill explained, "the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.' 14 1 Fletcher argues, "The harm principle implies the same
harm should be the basis of punishment regardless of the identity of
the victim. Thus the harm principle, as an expression of a liberal and
universal system of criminal justice, excludes parochial crimes

136.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1621; see also 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *75.
[F]or treason is indeed a general appellation, made use of by the law, to denote
not only offences against the king and government, but also that accumulation
of guilt which arises whenever a superior reposes a confidence in a subject or
inferior, between whom and himself there subsists a natural, a civil, or even a
spiritual relation; and inferior so abuses that confidence, so forgets the
obligations of duty, subjection, and allegiance, as to destroy the life of any such
his superior or lord.... [T]herefore for a wife to kill her lord or husband, a
servant his lord or master, and an ecclesiastic his lord or ordinary; these being
breaches of the lower allegiance, of private and domestic faith, are denominated
petit treasons. But when disloyalty so rears its crest, as to attack even majesty
itself, it is called by way of eminent distinction high treason ....
Id.
137.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason,supra note 88, at 1621.
138.
Id. at 1618.
139.
Id. at 1619. With respect to adultery, Fletcher specifically refers to Jewish
law in which the wife could commit the crime of adultery, but the husband could not.
Id. at 1618.
140.
Fletcher cites Mill only once, id. at 1619 n.36, and cites to only one
commentator, id. at 1619 n.37.
141.
JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 13
(Ashley H. Thorndike ed., MacMillan Co. 1926) (1859) ("The only part of the conduct of
any one for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself,
over his own body and mind the individual is sovereign.").
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directed toward specifically marked groups. ...."142 Treason violates
the harm principle, according to Fletcher, because it is not
universal-it can only be committed against a particular group.
Even taking for granted both Fletcher's understanding of Mill's
harm principle and his assumption that the harm principle is central
to the "nature and purpose" of criminal law, 143 there is still reason to
disagree with Fletcher on his own terms.
The current U.S.
understanding of treason does not necessarily preclude universality
144
in the class of potential victims. As Fletcher elsewhere recognizes,
the group of individuals who owe allegiance to the United States and
who can thus commit treason extends beyond citizens. The group
includes individuals who are present in the United States. 145 As

142.

Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1620.

143.
144.

Id. at 1612.

See FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 57.

From whom may the modern nation-state exact a duty of loyalty?... The
answer in conventional legal terms is that loyalty is due only from citizens and
those like permanent residents of the state who stand in an ongoing
relationship of interdependence and expected gratitude with the society the
state represents. This, then, is the modern domain of loyalty. These are the
people who are subject to prosecution for treason if they act disloyally toward
their country.

Id.
145.
For the common law origins of this concept, see supra note 51 and
accompanying text. This principle has been adopted in the United States as well. In
Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147 (1873), British citizens resident in the United
States sued for the return of cotton that the Union Army had seized from them. They
argued that they had committed treason by aiding the Confederacy and thereby were
subject to the presidential pardon that had been issued for all Civil War treasons. Id.
at 150-51. The Supreme Court held that the British citizens could sue for return of
their cotton, accepting the Britons' argument that they had committed treason. Id. at
155-56. The Court explained the difference between the allegiance owed by an alien
and that owed by a citizen as follows:
The citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his
government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he
renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or another
sovereign. The alien, whilst domiciled in the country, owes a local and
temporary allegiance, which continues during the period of his residence.
Id. at 154. The Court also noted that "This obligation of temporary allegiance by an
alien resident in a friendly country is everywhere recognized by publicists and
statesmen." Id.; see also Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210, 211-12 (1877).
As a foreigner domiciled in this country, he was bound to obey all the laws of
the United States not immediately relating to citizenship, and was equally
amenable with citizens to the penalties prescribed for their infraction. He owed
allegiance to the government of the country so long as he resided within its
limits, and can claim no exemption from the statutes passed to punish treason,
or the giving of aid and comfort to the insurgent States. The law on this subject
is well settled and universally recognized.
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Blackstone explains, those who owe allegiance to a sovereign may
commit treason against it, and "this allegiance. .. was distinguished
into [two sorts or] species: the one natural and perpetual, which is
inherent only in natives of the king's dominions; the other local and
temporary, which is incident to aliens also. ' 14 6 The logical corollary
of this delimitation is that those who can commit treason are also
constitutive of those to whom all others in the group owe allegiance.
Thus, the group of potential victims of treason-those injured by the
traitor's betrayal-extends to any individual present in the United
States. 147 The cohort of individuals present in the United States will
not be universal at any single point in time, but it is in fact a fluid
group whose membership is open to any individual of any citizenship
who enters the United States. 148 It is therefore not clear that treason
can be committed only against a particular, limited group. The
'149
examples Fletcher gives of such groups are "women or blacks.
These groups are immutable; the category of persons against whom
treason against the United States may be committed is not.
Another possible antiliberal aspect of treason, building on
Fletcher's statements, is that it stems from the relationship between
"a particular sovereign and subordinate subjects. '150 "A particular
sovereign" evokes images of the British kings and queens of old, who
were the original objects of the subjects' duty of allegiance. But even
in Britain the object of the duty shifted over time from the person of
the king to the political polity. By the British Civil War, "[t]reason
was not simply a crime against the king's natural person or a breach
of allegiance but had increasingly become the unlawful seizure of
sovereign or state power."'15 1 The violence of the Civil War and the
"ideological demands of regicide led to the appropriation of a fully
impersonal conception of the state in which the king, acting beyond

146.

BLACKSTONE, supra note 136, at *74.

147.
One exception to this rule is those individuals who enter the United States
for the purpose of attacking the country. Such hostile invaders are never under the
protection of the sovereign that they attack, and they therefore cannot commit treason
against the sovereign because they do not owe the sovereign allegiance. In the United
States, the non-U.S. citizen Quirin saboteurs are examples of hostile invaders. In
Britain, a famous example of a hostile invader is Perkin Warbeck. JOHN BAKER, 6 THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND, 1483-1558, at 216-217 (2003). Warbeck

was a citizen of Flanders, which was not at war with England, and he claimed to be the
Duke of York. Id. Warbeck was captured after several armed attempts to invade
England and overthrow Henry VII. Id. The English courts held that Warbeck could not
be tried for treason because he was a hostile invader and owed no allegiance; instead,
he was prosecuted under martial law. See id.
148.
Some individuals, like those prohibited from entering the United States
because they are on terrorist watchlists, would obviously be excluded, but by in large,
the category of persons is wide open.
149.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1620.
150.
Id. at 1621 (emphasis added).
151.
ORR, supra note 8, at 2.
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had derogated from the
his commission as an inferior magistrate,
52
sovereign authority of the people.'
The Framers avoided the problem of loyalty to the king by
redefining the sovereign as the people of the democracy, as
represented by the United States.1 53 This is a liberal and democratic
construction: treason is now the violation of allegiance of a member of
a polity to the whole, a breach of allegiance by the people (a person) of
be
the people. 154 Israel made a similar shift in redefining treason to 155
waging war against Israel rather than against the British King.
Thus, although it might be antiliberal if treason were to be based on
loyalty to the person of the king, this is no longer the conception of
the object to which allegiance is due in the United Kingdom, United
156
States, or Israel.
Fletcher's second argument, which also relies on Mill's harm
principle, is stronger than his first one. He is correct that, in English

152.
Id. at 4. For a detailed explanation of the development of the conception of
the English state for purposes of treason law, see id. at 30-58 (chapter entitled
"Sovereignty and State").
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (banning "Treason against the United
153.
States").
Some liberals might argue that continued valorization of the state itself
154.
and the idea that citizens owe any duty to their state is itself an outmoded and
antiliberal construction. Part IIJ.D addresses this argument and proposes that loyalty
is still due to the state even on a liberal contractarian model because individuals derive
numerous benefits from their state or states of citizenship and/or residence.
155.
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
156.
In March 2008, Lord Goldsmith, a former U.K. Attorney General, issued a
report on citizenship in the United Kingdom in which he suggested modernizing and
updating the law of treason. Lord Goldsmith, Citizenship: Our Common Bond,
CITIZENSHIP REV., Mar. 2008, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/reviews/docs/
citizenship-report-full.pdf. Goldsmith identified numerous ambiguities in the law due
to its ancient character, but concluded
[T]he offence of treason nevertheless ought to be retained in order to recognize
the particularly grave nature of acts that are committed with the aim of
overthrowing the government or harming fellow members of society by those
who, either as UK citizens or residents, owe a duty of loyalty to the UK.
Id. at 81. Goldsmith and press commentators situated their concern about treason law
in the ongoing debate about the meaning of being British. One commentator noted,
"Before the crime of treason can be redefined, it's necessary for the UK to determine
how we shall define the relationship between the citizen and the state. You can't define
treachery unless you've first defined allegiance. What duties of allegiance do citizens
owe to the state?" Gary Slapper, The Law Explored: Treason, TIMES ONLINE (U.K.), Mar.
19, 2008, http:/Ibusiness.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/aw/columnists/article3583851.ece.
He continued, "[How [treason is] defined is vitally important because it rests on
whatever duty we collectively agree as citizens to owe to the state." Id. To demonstrate
how out of date the current treason law is, commentators also noted that 25 Edward III's
prohibition on "violating' the wife of the king's son and heir could have resulted in
treason charges for the five men alleged to have had sexual relations with Princess Diana
while she was married to Prince Charles. Michael Herman, An Ancient Law with Modern
Resonance, TIMES ONLINE (U.K.), Mar. 11, 2008, http:/fbusiness.timesonline.co.uk/tolI
business/law/article3531015.ece; Slapper, supra.
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law, treason likely did violate the harm principle by focusing
exclusively on internal attitudes in some cases. One of the headings
of treason in 25 Edward III was to "compass or imagine the Death of
our Lord the King. ' 157 With 25 Edward III as an example, the Oxford
English Dictionary defines "compass" to mean, "To contrive, devise,
machinate (a purpose). Usually in a bad sense. 15 8 The idea that a
mere compassing or imagining could constitute treason casts a broad
net for the crime and does not require actual harm or even the
potentiality of harm to the King. In the "compassing the death of the
King" formulation, treason likely did violate Mill's harm principle, as
Fletcher suggests. Willard Hurst notes:
The charge of compassing the king's death had been the principal
instrument by which 'treason' had been used to suppress a wide range
of political opposition, from acts obviously dangerous to order and likely
in fact to lead to the king's death to the mere speaking or writing of
159
views restrictive of the royal authority.

But the compassing prong of 25 Edward III was deliberately omitted
from the U.S. Constitution. The Framers, by omitting "any provision
analogous to that in English law which punished compassing the
death of the king[,] removed the foundation on which the English
judges had built much of the reprobated structure of 'constructive'
160
treasons."'
The elimination of compassing-thought treasons in the United
States takes the wind out of Fletcher's sails by ruling out the historic
category of cases that would have been most likely to violate the
harm principle. Additionally, precedents arising from World War II
propagandist cases have shifted the "gravamen" of the crime to the
1 61
accused traitors' actions rather than their "internal attitudes.'
The Supreme Court has held that the "adhering to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort" prong of the Treason Clause requires
proof of two elements: "adherence to the enemy; and rendering [the
enemy] aid and comfort. 1 62 The adherence requirement evokes the
internal attitudes that Fletcher argues are antiliberal. The courts
have held that an act of aid and comfort absent intent to betray is not
treason, nor is intent to betray without an overt act of aid and
comfort. 16 3 The intent requirement, however, is not a subjective

157.

Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. III, c. 2, stat. 5 (Eng.).

158.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2008) (entry for "Compass").

159.
Treason-PartII, supra note 79, at 429.
160.
Id. at 411.
161.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1621.
162.
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945).
163.
E.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 (1952) ("Intent to adhere
to the enemy is required in treason."); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945)
("A citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the enemy and harbor sympathies or
convictions disloyal to this country's policy or interest, but so long as he commits no act
of aid and comfort to the enemy, there is no treason.").
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inquiry. Several of the World War II propagandists argued that they
acted out of patriotism and in the best interests of the United States,
and that they had no intent to betray the United States. They
claimed that their propaganda urging the United States to stay out of
the war and later to surrender was an attempt to aid the United
States. 16 4 The courts rejected all such arguments. The First Circuit
in the Chandler case-the first and most widely cited of the
propagandist cases-explained, "Whether Chandler was 'sincere' in
what he did, whether he had the heart of a patriot, is a matter that
may be sifted out at the last Great Judgment Seat; but the law of
treason is concerned with matters more immediate.' 1 65 The courts
focused on the accused traitors' actions and from those actions
presumed that the intent element was satisfied; in doing so, they put
the focus of the treason trial and appellate review on the actions
themselves rather than on the "internal attitudes" about which
Fletcher is concerned.1 6 6 Thus, the United States has kept its
definition of treason and avoided the more drastic redefinitions
undertaken by France and Germany, but it has not ignored the
antiliberal characteristics that Fletcher identifies. The U.S. courts
have responded, perhaps to Fletcher's "liberal" discomfort, by working

164.
See, e.g., D'Aquino, 192 F.2d 338, 353-54 (9th Cir. 1951) (summarizing the
defendant's claim that the radio program's purpose was to boost the morale of U.S.
troops); Chandler, 171 F.2d 921, 943-44 (1st Cir. 1948) (rejecting the defendant's
argument that he acted from patriotic motives and thus had no intent to betray).
165.
Chandler, 171 F.2d at 943.
166.
It is, perhaps, a separate question whether this approach is faithful to the
intention of the Framers in drafting the Constitutional definition of treason or of the
early Congress that adopted the treason statute. It could be argued that the admittedly
difficult inquiry into the traitor's intention was supposed to be a hurdle for treason
prosecutions and that the courts have essentially written it out of the Treason Clause
by presuming intent from the actions. But perhaps this hurdle would have been
entirely prohibitive, which is a result the Framers surely did not intend. Willard Hurst
deals with this issue by arguing, though not in the context of propagandists, that what
the courts ignore is motive rather than intent. HURST, supra note 78, at 195.
The crucial fact in the court's mind in these situations seems always to
be ...the defendant's knowledge that he is dealing with the enemy or rebel. If,
having such knowledge, the defendant then sells supplies or gives money or
concealment, he in fact specifically intends the ultimate, prohibited effect, to
aid the enemy, or to contribute to the levy of war. In this state of proof, the plea
of profit or friendship seeks to raise not the issue of his intention, but the more
remote question of his motive; and it is merely applying the elementary
doctrine to hold that if defendant had the specific intention to bring about a
result which the law seeks to prevent, his motive is irrelevant.
Id. It may be, however, that in the case of a propagandist, whose entire act of aid and
comfort consists in transmitting a message, the content of the message and the intent
of the propagandist in propagating the message might be more relevant than in a more
traditional aid and comfort scenario, such as the Haupt case where the father gave his
traitor son shelter and helped his son to obtain employment.
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within the old definition of treason but shifting their inquiry to the
defendant's actions rather than his or her intent.
By claiming that treason violates the harm principle, 16 7 Fletcher
seems to assume that because treason has a mental element it does
not cause harm. As just discussed, the U.S. courts have put the focus
in treason inquiries on the accused's actions, which presumably do
cause harm. The courts have been less than clear about what "aid
and comfort" (i.e., harm) a propagandist's actions provide,16 8 but the
presumed harm is the demoralization the propaganda causes among
American listeners, particularly American troops who hear the
broadcasts. In non-propagandist cases, the harm is even clearer. In
Haupt, for example, the father who provided his saboteur son with
food, shelter, and assistance in obtaining a car and employment
"forward[ed] the saboteur in his mission," 169 thereby assisting the
enemy of the United States. Aid to a U.S. enemy is necessarily (even
if indirectly) harmful to the United States because it both strengthens
the enemy and weakens the United States via demoralization when
the aid to the enemy becomes known.
Although the potential
punishment for treason may in some instances be disproportionate to
the harm caused by the traitor, 170 that issue should be taken into
account at sentencing, and thus mere prosecution for treason does not
violate the harm principle unless one assumes that the treason itself
is harmless.
In sum, Fletcher's two-pronged antiliberal critique of treason
seems unavailing. The community against which treason may be
committed is fluid and therefore does not violate the universality
Fletcher argues is required by the harm principle. Neither the
United Kingdom nor the United States nor Israel conceives of the
sovereign as the person of a king but rather as the polity of which the
traitor is a part and whose protection the traitor has enjoyed.
Finally, the United States, while not explicitly revising its treason
statute or Treason Clause, has refocused its law of treason via court
interpretations away from internal attitudes and toward external
actions.
B. Too Difficult To Prove
From the time of the treason statute of Edward III in 1351,
statutory framers have attempted to cabin treason. The treason

167.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1621.
168.
Hurst notes generally, "In view of the potentialities for good and evil in the
instrument of treason prosecutions, it is surprising how little judicial imagination has
been stirred to clarifying analysis in such cases as have presented themselves." HURST,
supra note 78, at 186.
169.
Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 635 (1947).
170.
See infra pp. 1498-1502.
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statute of Edward III was itself an attempt to limit the actions that
could bring about a treason charge, and English commentaries from
the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries evidence a restrictive
interpretation of treason. 171 In addition to limiting the range of
conduct that can be prosecuted as treason in 25 Edward III, English
law increased the evidentiary difficulty of proving treason by
172
requiring two witnesses.
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution restricted treason even
further by narrowing the behavior chargeable as treason only to acts
of levying war against the United States or giving aid and comfort to
its enemies. 173 They also increased the evidentiary burden by
requiring two witnesses to the same overt act. 174 As the U.S.
Supreme Court explained in Cramer, "Certainly the treason rule,
whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive .... The provision was
adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of
prosecution but because of them."'1 75
The Framers-and their
English predecessors-intended treason to be difficult to prove; the
evidentiary burden served as a guarantee against fraudulent,
politically motivated treason prosecutions by ensuring the convictions
would not be obtained based on flimsy evidence.
Some have suggested that the evidentiary requirements for
proving treason mean that it will no longer be used, particularly
against terrorist-related offenses, because the United States and

171.

Willard Hurst, English Sources of the American Law of Treason, 1945 WIS.

L. REV. 315, 355 (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of British treatises in the
Cramer case and stating "[flrom these sources [the Court] recognized the deep historic
roots of the general policy restrictive of the scope of the crime").
The English commentaries undertake to implement the general restrictive
policy adopted toward the crime of treason particularly by trying to set defined
limits to the scope of treasonable intent, and by insisting on the showing of an
overt act as protection against persecution for thought or belief, or peaceful
political activity.
Id. at 356.
172.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
173.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2; see also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 127
(1807) ("It is... more safe as well as more consonant to the principles of our
constitution, that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to
doubtful cases.").
174.
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24 ("[The Framers] wrote into the
organic act of the new government a prohibition of legislative or judicial creation of
new treasons. And a venerable safeguard against false testimony was given a novel
application by requiring two witnesses to the same overt act.").
175.
Id. at 47-48. But see Paul T. Crane, Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge?:
Reassessing Cramer v. United States and Its Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 53), available at http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1322445 ("If the holding in Cramer had made treason
prosecutions too difficult to pursue and convictions too difficult to obtain, the DOJ must
have missed the memo, because it continued to bring prosecutions at a healthy rate
during the decade following Cramer.").
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United Kingdom have other laws-for example, the material support
laws in the United States-to address terrorist-related crimes. 176 As
an illustration, George Fletcher noted that the U.S. government
failed to prosecute the "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh for
treason and speculated that "the government has a whole array of
other offenses at its disposal, all of which are easier to prove in court
than is treason."'177 Similarly, the United Kingdom's Lord Carlile, the
Independent Reviewer of terrorism legislation, 178 noted in relation to
a possible treason charge against the radical cleric Omar Bakri
Mohammed,

179

"[T]reason law is very specific.

I suspect that there

are far more appropriate crimes already on the statute book."' 8 0 On

176.
U.S. Code provisions that are used to combat support to terrorist
organizations include, among others: 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2006) ("Harboring or concealing
terrorists"); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006) ("Providing material support to terrorists"); 18
U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) ("Providing material support or resources to designated foreign
terrorist organizations"); 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (2006) ("Prohibitions against the financing
of terrorism"); and 18 U.S.C. § 2339D (2006) ("Receiving military-type training from a
foreign terrorist organization"). See also Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552
F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (partially invalidating 18 U.S.C. §2339A), cert. granted sub
nom. Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 2009 U.S. Lexis 5147 (Sept. 30, 2009). In
the United Kingdom, similar provisions are found in the Terrorism Act 2000. See, e.g.,
Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, §§ 11-12, 14-18 (Eng.).
177.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1627; see generally Crane,
supra note 175 (arguing that the Court's sanction in Cramer for prosecutors to charge
treasonous conduct under various other criminal headings and the relative ease of
obtaining conviction under such alternative headings largely accounted for prosecutors'
failure to charge treason until the Gadahn indictment). The recent case of Bryant Neal
Vinas, a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert from Long Island, may support their
argument. Vinas was captured in Pakistan in November 2008 fighting with Al Qaeda,
and in January 2009, he pleaded guilty to charges of material support and conspiracy
to commit murder, a charge stemming from firing rockets at a U.S. military base in
Afghanistan. Sebastian Rotella & Josh Meyer, U.S.-Born Militant Who Fought for Al
Qaeda is in Custody, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/jul23/nationna-american-jihad23. On the other hand, Vinas is in U.S. custody
and pleaded guilty. It is possible that the government agreed to forego a treason
charge, with its possible accompanying death penalty, obtain the guilty plea on lesser
charges and Vinas's assistance with additional investigations.
178.

See LORD CARLILE OF BERRIEW Q.C., A REPORT BY LORD CARLILE OF

BERRIEW Q.C.: INDEPENDENT REVIEWER OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION (2007), available
at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/terrorism-act2000/carlile-terrorism-definition.pdf?view=Binary
(Lord Carlile's report on the
definition of terrorism).
179.
See supranotes 111-13 and accompanying text.
180.
Morris, supra note 111; see also DU CANN, supra note 15, at 265.
Treason in peacetime has become anachronistic. The prosecuting authorities
naturally fight shy of invoking the difficult and obscure Norman-French
feudalistic statute of Edward III when they have more up-to-date, more
efficient, if slighter weapons to hand in modern times. The Official Secrets Acts
of 1911 and 1920 and the Treachery Act of 1940 are good examples of such
alternative weapons. Such forms of treason as can be more conveniently dealt
with under the laws relating to sedition or to incitement to 'mutiny or
disaffection' are invariably dealt with in peacetime under such relatively minor
laws as these.
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their face, terrorism laws passed in the last fifteen years in both the
United States and United Kingdom do appear easier to prove than
the specific elements and heightened evidentiary requirements in the
treason statutes. However, technological advancements have made
treason easier to prove in several ways.
First, Fletcher and Lord Carlile overlook how the changed
nature of some treasonous acts decreases the intended evidentiary
difficulty.
The statute of Edward III was aimed primarily at
prosecuting barons who plotted in their castles with a small group of
like-minded individuals to attack the king's installations or the king
himself. Or in the U.S. context, the treason statute was supposed to
allow prosecution of individuals such as Aaron Burr, who allegedly
plotted to challenge the authority of the United States and claim land
in the southwest for the establishment of a new government. 181 In
these archetypal treason cases, the two-witness requirement
presented a significant guarantee of evidentiary reliability. The twowitness requirement continued to fulfill this function into the
twentieth century. The requirement caused Cramer's acquittal for
his association with the Quirin saboteurs. 8 2 The two witness
requirement may have provided some protection for the
propagandists who were convicted of treason.
Propagandists
constituted five of the seven treason convictions in the United States
as a result of World War II actions, 183 and in Britain, Joyce was
convicted for his propaganda activities.' 8 4 The evidence against the
World War II propagandists consisted of not only their own
recordings but also witnesses to the making of those recordings.185

Id.
181.

See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 133 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Marshall,

C.J.); NATHANIEL WEYL, TREASON: THE STORY OF DISLOYALTY AND BETRAYAL IN

AMERICAN HISTORY 110-62 (1950) (providing a colorful account of the Burr conspiracy
and subsequent trials).
182.
See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 67 (1945) (reversing the lower
courts' finding that Cramer was guilty of treason).
183.
The World War II propagandist cases that resulted in federal opinions are
as follows: D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951); Best v. United
States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir.
1950); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948); United States v.
Burgman, 87 F. Supp. 568 (D.D.C. 1949). The other two treason convictions that were
upheld occurred in Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947) and Kawakita v.
United States, 190 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1951).
184.
Joyce v. Dir. of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347, 348 (H.L) (U.K.).
185.
See D'Aquino, 192 F.2d at 352.
The overt act No. 6 was testified to by the requisite number of witnesses who
observed and listened to the broadcast in question. One of them was a
participant in the same Zero Hour program. He told the appellant of a release
from Japanese General Headquarters giving the American ship losses in one of
the Leyte Gulf battles and requested appellant to allude to those losses. She
proceeded, as this witness and another testified, to type a script about the loss
of ships. That evening, when appellant was present in the studio, the news
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The march of technology, however, may have greatly decreased
the protective power of the two witness requirement, at least for
certain types of treason, since the World War II propagandists were
convicted. The World War II cases are unclear about whether the
recordings themselves plus two witnesses identifying a defendant by
his or her voice in the recording would have been sufficient to satisfy
the two witness requirement. Such a determination was unnecessary
because the prosecution procured witnesses to the overt acts of
making the recordings.' 8 6 All of the propagandists were regular
18 7
so
employees of the German and Japanese propaganda ministries,
finding coworkers who could testify to the making of the recordings
was possible and likely was more convincing to a jury than witnesses
testifying solely to recognizing the defendants' voices in the
recordings. The cases, therefore, do not settle the legal question of
whether two witnesses would have to testify to seeing Gadahn make
a propaganda video or instead whether identification of Gadahn in a
broadcast video would be sufficient. The latter view appears to be
consistent with the letter of the constitutional text and likely also
satisfies its purpose of assuring reliability. The accuracy of an
identification by someone viewing a video, as opposed to just listening
to a World War II-era audio recording, would be quite high.

announcer broadcast that the Americans had lost many ships in the battle of
Leyte Gulf. Thereupon appellant was introduced on the radio and proceeded to
say in substance: 'Now you fellows have lost all your ships. You really are
orphans of the Pacific. Now how do you think you will ever get home?'
Id.; Gillars, 182 F.2d at 968 ("As to the overt act No. 10, on the basis of which she was
convicted, three witnesses, Schnell, Haupt and von Richter, testified to her
participation in the recording of [the radio drama] Vision of Invasion and she admits so
doing.").
Not two, but half a dozen or more witnesses testified of their personal
knowledge to his continuous day-by-day participation in the work of the short
wave station, attendance at conferences to receive directives as to the current
propaganda line, the preparation of manuscripts for his regular Paul Revere
broadcasts, and the submission of them subsequently for censorship,
collaboration occasionally with other employees of the short wave station in the
preparation of special programs to be broadcast jointly, the making of
recordings for subsequent broadcasts, etc. The authenticity of the twelve
sample Paul Revere recordings introduced into evidence was established by
competent testimony, and is not challenged by the defendant.
Chandler, 171 F.2d at 940; cf. Burgman, 87 F. Supp. at 571 (noting that defendant's
propaganda recordings were admitted into evidence and played at trial, but discussing
the recordings only in determining that they did not violate the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
186.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
187.
See D'Aquino, 192 F.2d at 347 (Broadcasting Corporation of Japan); Best,
184 F.2d at 133 (German Radio Broadcasting Company); Gillars, 182 F.2d at 966
(German Radio Broadcasting Company); Chandler, 171 F.2d at 924 (German Radio
Broadcasting Company); Burgman, 87 F. Supp. at 569 (German Radio Broadcasting
Company).
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Additional technology, such as various types of biometric
identification, would also allow Gadahn to be identified with
confidence from the visual images in the videos. Gadahn has also
helped to identify himself by destroying his U.S. passport in one
video.188

The meaning of the evidentiary requirement-two witnesses to
making a video versus two witnesses identifying the propagandist
based upon viewing a video-may be determined by how the overt act
is phrased in the indictment in any particular case. In the World
War II cases, the overt acts alleged were making propaganda
189
recordings or participating in meetings to plan such recordings.

188.
189.

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See D'Aquino, 192 F.2d at 348.

Appellant was found guilty of the commission of overt act No. 6 only, which in
the language of the indictment, was: 'That on a day during October, 1944, the
exact date being to the Grand Jurors unknown, said defendant, at Tokyo,
Japan, in a broadcasting studio of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, did
speak into a microphone concerning the loss of ships.'

Id.
The overt acts, like those submitted to the jury in the Chandler case, related for
the most part to typical routine activities of Best, on identified occasions, in
fulfillment of the purpose of his continuous employment as radio commentator
and news editor for the German Propaganda Ministry. For instance, one of the
overt acts related to Best's participation in a particular round-table conference
of commentators, whose unrehearsed discussion and colloquy were recorded by
a microphone and subsequently broadcast to the United States. Another overt
act established by two-witness proof was Best's making of a live broadcast of a
special program prepared by him, in conjunction with a German Luftwaffe
officer who had accompanied the German paratroopers participating in the
'liberation' of Mussolini.
Best, 184 F.2d at 137.
A verdict of guilty was returned, based on the commission of overt act No. 10,
which is set forth in the indictment as follows: '10. That on a day between
January 1, 1944 and June 6, 1944, the exact date being to the Grand Jurors
unknown, said defendant, at Berlin, Germany, did speak into a microphone in a
recording studio of the German Radio Broadcasting Company, and thereby did
participate in a phonographic recording and cause to be phonographically
recorded a radio drama... well knowing that said recorded radio drama was to
be subsequently broadcast by the German Radio Broadcasting Company to the
United States and to its citizens and soldiers at home and abroad as an
element of German propaganda and an instrument of psychological warfare.'
Gillars,182 F.2d at 966.
Generally described, one of these overt acts was arranging for the making of a
recording, two were speaking into a microphone in the actual recording of talks
for broadcast, one was participation in a conference for improvement in the
operation of the Short Wave Station, two were attendance and participation in
conferences of radio commentators at which directives were received from
higher authority relative to the content of broadcasts, four were participation in
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The government had and introduced co-worker witnesses to
substantiate the defendants' actions. 190 In contrast, the Gadahn
indictment alleges five overt acts of "appear[ing] in" Al Qaeda
videos. 191 From this phrasing it seems likely that the government
intends to argue that identification of Gadahn from the broadcast
videos is sufficient to satisfy the two-witness requirement. Gadahn's
video appearances have been broadcast over the internet and
replayed on media outlets. 192 Thus, they have been available to U.S.
audiences, including individuals who knew Gadahn prior to his
departure from the United States and who can identify him. The
ease of satisfying the two witness requirement for propagandists
suggests that it may be no more difficult to prove they committed
treason than to prove that they committed other crimes, such as
193
material support, with which Gadahn is also charged.
Second, technological advances have made some types of treason
easier to detect. Governments are now able to use sophisticated
technology to track the movement of money internationally and to
wiretap various lines of communication linked to an individual under
suspicion. In the Bishara case, for example, the Israeli police and
Shin Bet used wiretaps to record Bishara's conversations during the
June 2006 war, 194 and thus presumably an Israeli prosecutor would
introduce at trial audiotapes that could be authenticated by the police
and by voice matching software.
In the wake of 9/11, various
countries have cracked down on terrorist financing (the provision of
which could, in certain circumstances, amount to treason), in part
ordered by the U.N. Security Council, and have shown themselves
adept at tracking the movement of funds, though criticism has arisen
that some governments are too invasive in their information
gathering. 19 5 New technologies have allowed them not only to obtain

conferences aimed at securing the resumption or continuance of defendant's
broadcasting activities.
Chandler, 171 F.2d at 928; Burgman, 87 F. Supp. at 569 ("Each overt act consisted of
making a specific recording.").
190.
See supra note 185.
191.
Indictment of Adam Gadahn, supra note 90, at para. 8.
192.
See Raffi Khatchadourian, Azzam the American; The Making of an Al
Qaeda homegrown, NEW YORKER, Jan. 22, 2007, at 50 ("[Gadahn] has addressed the
United States in five videos, most of which reach a wide audience on the Internet and,
in some form or another, have been discussed on the evening news.").
193.
See Indictment of Adam Gadahn, supra note 90, at 9 ("Beginning on or
about September 11, 2005... defendant ADAM GADAHN... did knowingly provide,
and aid and abet the provision of, material support and resources... to a foreign
terrorist organization .... ).
194.
McCarthy, supra note 114.
195.
See, e.g., James Risen, U.S. Reaches Tentative Deal with Europe on Bank
Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A6 (discussing the reasons for and implications of
"[a] new agreement between the Bush administration and the European Union [that]
will allow the United States government to continue a once secret program to obtain
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the information quickly but also to sort and thereby utilize it more
efficiently.
Finally, technological developments since World War II have
made the transmission of information from the battlefield easier and
faster. If a citizen were captured fighting against his home state on
the battlefield, it would now be much easier to transmit and thereby
preserve evidence regarding his actions for use in a future
prosecution. Though this has not yet arisen in the contemplated
treason prosecutions and battlefield evidence would undoubtedly still
be difficult to obtain, the ability to transmit photos, videos, and
documents over the internet and to preserve and duplicate them
means that evidence of treason is more likely to be available today
than it was in the World War II era.
C. Stability and Security
Commentators have suggested that treason fell into disuse
because the relevant states did not face conflict like World War II,
which last prompted them to employ treason. The Cramer Court at
the end of World War II noted, "We have managed to do without
treason prosecutions to a degree that probably would be impossible
except while a people was singularly confident of external security
and internal stability."'1 96 George Fletcher hypothesized, "Insecure
states are more likely to sense betrayal and to invoke criminal
sanctions as a way of demonstrating their supremacy over threats
from within. More secure states, such as the United States, might
197
find that they can live quite well without the crime of treason."'
These statements make intuitive sense, and thus raise the question of
why the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel are all
considering or actually charging treason. The answer may lie in
teasing out what exactly about the World War II context prompted
treason prosecutions. Two possible answers would be the magnitude
of the threat and the nature of the threat.
Taking first the issue of the magnitude of the threat, there is no
doubt that the Axis powers in World War II posed an enormous
threat to the United States and particularly to Britain. The Nazis

banking records ...for use in counterterrorism investigations ....); Jamie Smyth, EU

Says Secret Transfer of Bank Data to US Was Illegal, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 23, 2006, at 19
(discussing how the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications'
(Swift) agreement to "secretly [pass] European citizens' banking records to the US"
after 9/11 violated the EU data protection directive).
196.
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 26 (1945).

197.

Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1627; see also Larson, supra

note 89, at 925 ("Forgetting the law of treason, of course, is a luxury of stable
societies.").
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had plans to invade Britain'9" and subjected Britain to intense
bombing campaigns. 199 The attacks on Britain and the proximity of
enemy-occupied territory just across the English Channel brought the
threat home to the British. The United States also suffered an
assault on its territory when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.
Additionally, the United States patrolled its shores for Nazi U-boats,
and some, like the submarines that deposited the Quirin saboteurs,
reached or approached the U.S. mainland. The sheer numbers of
military casualties suffered by the Allies also demonstrated the great
magnitude of the threat posed by the Axis powers.
It is possible that some government officials view the current
terrorist threats facing the United States and the United Kingdom as
sufficiently strong to spark the insecurity that commentators suggest
is a prerequisite to treason charges. The 9/11 attacks in the United
States inflicted over nearly 3,000 casualties in a single day, 20 0 and
they occurred in U.S. cities, centers of power. In their aftermath, the
U.S. public lived in fear of additional attacks, though such attacks
have not materialized and the level of fear has abated. The London
subway and bus bombings of July 2005 caused fifty deaths, the
largest number of civilian deaths in an attack on London since the
German bombing runs in World War 11.201 A failed bombing in
London shortly after the successful 7/7 suicide bombings further
increased insecurity in Britain. 202 Israel, though it has not suffered
from a single attack of the magnitude of 9/11, has suffered terribly
from suicide bombings, especially since the beginning of the second
Palestinian intifada in September 2000.203 According to the BBC, the

198.
See, e.g., John P. Campbell, A British Plan to Invade England, 1941, 58 J.
MIL. HIST. 663 (1994) (describing the British attempt in 1941 to predict what the
planned German invasion of Britain, termed Operation Sealion, in 1940 would have
entailed in order to defend against presumed future attack); H.A. DeWeerd, Hitler's
Plans for Invading Britain, 12 MIL. AFF. 142 (1948) (discussing Hitler's preparation for
landing operation against Britain in 1940 and the reasons for his decision not to
execute the planned attack).
199.
See DeWeerd, supra note 198, at 145-46.
200.
See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-2 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
911/report/index.htm ('More than 2,600 people died at the World Trade Center; 125
died at the Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes.").
201.
See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Subway and Bus Blasts in London Kill at Least 37,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at Al ("Bomb explosions tore through three subway trains
and a red-painted double-decker bus in a coordinated terror attack during London's
morning rush hour on Thursday, killing at least 37 people, wounding about
700 ....The attacks were the worst in British memory since World War II."); Kevin
Cullen, In WWII Remembrance, Londoners Look Ahead with Bombings, Patriotic
Tribute Has New Meaning, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 2005, at A8.
202.
See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Bombs Set at 4 London Sites, but Fail to Explode,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at Al.
203.
See, e.g., IAN J. BICKERTON & CARLA L. KLAUSNER, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 339-43 (Charlyce Jones Owen et al. eds., 4th ed. 2005);
Robert Fisk, Horror in the Afternoon: Israel Retaliates with Air Strikes After 15 Killed
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death toll among Israelis during the intifada from 2000 to the
beginning of 2005 surpassed nine hundred. 20 4 Taken cumulatively,
the death toll exceeds that incurred by Israel during the Six-Day War
in 1967.205

It is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify precisely the
magnitude of threat. The magnitude assessment is ultimately an
objective one, however, so attacked states can and should resort to
the opinions of outside organizations and states. In the case of the
9/11 attacks, the U.N. Security Council, NATO, and the Organization
of American States deemed the 9/11 attacks to be the equivalent of an
20 6
armed attack and thus sufficient to permit an armed response.
Israel went to war with a terrorist group in 2006 when it attacked
Hezbollah in Lebanon; 20 7 the conflict was emphatically not between
Israel and the state of Lebanon. 208 It is unclear whether the objective

in Jerusalem Bombing, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 10, 2001, at 1;Howard Witt, 19
Israelis Die in Passover Bombing; 120 Wounded in Blast During Holiday Dinner, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 28, 2002, at N1.
204.
BBC News, Intifada Toll 2000-2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2[hi/middleeast/
3694350.stm (last visited Oct. 18, 2009). The toll among Palestinians was over three
thousand for the same period. Id.
205.
According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the death toll among
Israelis in the 1967 war was 759. Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Six-Day War Introduction, in 1-2 HISTORICAL DoCUMENTS: 1947-1974 (2003), http://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+19471947-1974/THE+SIXDAY+WAR+-+INTRODUCTION.htm.
206.
See infra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
207.
See, e.g., Greg Myre & Steven Erlanger, Clashes Spread to Lebanon as
Hezbollah Raids Israel, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at 1 (discussing Israel's military
response to the Hezbollah "daylight assault across the border on Wednesday, leading to
fighting in which two Israeli soldiers were captured and at least eight killed ....
");
Letter from Dan Gillerman, Permanent Representative of Isr. to the United Nations, to
Sec'y-Gen. and President of the Security Council, United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/60/937S/2006/515 (July 12, 2006), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc[UNDOC/GEN/
N06/426/71/PDF[N0642671.pdf?OpenElement.
This morning, Hezbollah terrorists unleashed a barrage of heavy artillery and
rockets into Israel, causing a number of deaths. In the midst of this horrific and
unprovoked act, the terrorists infiltrated Israel and kidnapped two Israeli
soldiers, taking them into Lebanon. Responsibility for this belligerent act of
war lies with the Government of Lebanon, from whose territory these acts have
been launched into Israel. Responsibility also lies with the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, which support and
embrace those who carried out this attack.
208.
Israel blamed Lebanon for allowing Hezbollah to operate in Lebanese
territory, see Letter from Dan Gillerman, Permanent Representative of Isr. to the
United Nations, to Sec'y-Gen. and President of the Security Council, United Nations,
U.N. Doc. A/60/937-S/2006/515 (July 12, 2006), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/
docIUNDOC/GEN/NO6/426/71/PDF1NO642671.pdfOpenElement ("The ineptitude and
inaction of the Government of Lebanon has led to a situation in which it has not
exercised jurisdiction over its own territory for many years."), but recognized that the
military action against Israel was done by Hezbollah, see id. ("In this vacuum festers
the Axis of Terror: Hezbollah and the terrorist States of Iran and Syria, which today
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threat from Hezbollah prior to the start of the conflict would have
been sufficient to justify a treason charge had Bishara's actions been
revealed earlier.
Once the conflict was underway, however,
Hezbollah's state-like capacity became evident to international
observers. 20 9
Thus, in practice, terrorist groups can pose the
magnitude of threat that prior to 9/11 was viewed as arising only
from another state, and if a group does pose such a threat, the
international community has proven willing to recognize the statelike capacity of terrorist groups. International opinion about the
magnitude of a threat can assist in an objective evaluation of the
threat's magnitude, freeing the assessment from dependence on the
opinion of the targeted state.
Another factor in the evaluation of the magnitude of harm posed
by terrorism might be the state's susceptibility to and history of
terrorist attacks. This would suggest that the United States, which
prior to 9/11 had no history of suffering foreign-organizationsponsored terrorist attacks on its soil, would be most susceptible to
feelings of insecurity from an attack. Britain, which has a history of
domestic terrorist attacks, particularly stemming from Irish
nationalist groups, 2 10 would be more inured to terrorism. Israel,
which has recently suffered large numbers of terrorist attacks, would
therefore be the most immune to feelings of insecurity from a single
additional attack. This lineup may shed light on why the United
States would be prone to indict for treason, while Britain-which has
a higher historic tolerance of terrorism and which suffered far less
destruction in the 7/7 attacks than did the United States in the 9/11
attacks-would be less likely to bend to insecurity that might spur a
treason prosecution. This typology suggests that Israel would be the
least likely to prosecute for treason, though Bishara's case indicates

have opened another chapter in their war of terror."); Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni,
Joint Press Conference by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and E.U. Envoy Javier Solana
(July 19, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.mfa.gov.ilfMFA/ Government/
Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/Joint+press+conference+by+FM+Tzipi+Livni+and+
EU+Envoy +Javier+Solana+19-Jul-2006.htm) ("Israel has no conflict with Lebanon.
Hizbullah opens a front with Israel to the Iranians, not to Lebanon."); see also id.
("Israel is fighting to end the control of Hizbullah over the lives of both Lebanese and
Israelis and to bring an end to its attempts to destabilize the region.").
209.
See, e.g., Steven Erlanger & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., A Disciplined Hezbollah
SurprisesIsrael with Its Training, Tactics and Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, at 8
("Hezbollah is a militia trained like an army and equipped like a state ... "); John
Kifner, Hezbollah Leads Work to Rebuild, Gaining Stature, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006,
at 1 ("Hezbollah was not, [Professor Amal Saad-Ghorayeb] said, a state within a state,
but rather 'a state within a non-state, actually."').
210.
See, e.g., London Bombs Were Huge, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1996,
at A8; T.R. Reid, Terror Returns to London; IRA Spinoff Responsible for Car Bombing,
Police Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2001, at A14; Richard W. Stevenson, I.R.A. Issues
Claim of Responsibility for London Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at 1.
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that Israel at this point might be closer to a treason prosecution than
Britain.
A simple explanation for this is that although Israel has become
somewhat accustomed to minor terror attacks, the Hezbollah conflict
in summer 2006 far exceeded Israel's tolerance level-rising to the
level of an armed attack equivalent to one that could have been levied
by a state.
More basically, Israel's small size and hostile
neighborhood likely contribute to greater feelings of insecurity for the
Israeli government than for its British and American counterparts.
The higher baseline level of insecurity might explain Israel's
willingness to employ treason charges throughout its history, as in
the Vanunu case, 2 11 and to adopt a treason law after World War II,
just when the crime was disappearing in other democracies.
Although terrorist attacks inflicting large numbers of casualties
on a state's home territory are cause for insecurity and although
terrorist groups have been recognized as capable of armed attacks
sufficient to provoke lawful armed response, the magnitude of the
threat posed by terrorist groups in an objective evaluation does not
approach that posed by the Axis powers in World War II. Magnitude
of the threat may explain the return of treason, but an alternate or
complementary explanation might be the perceived nature of the
threat. That is, both the World War II Axis powers and today's
terrorist groups might be perceived as posing an existential threat to
the target state. 2 12 Whereas magnitude describes the objective
seriousness of the threat in reality, nature (i.e., whether the threat is
existential or not) describes the subjective perception of the threat,
which may or may not align with an objective evaluation of its
magnitude. As argued above, a threat of a state-like magnitude from
a terrorist group would support a treason prosecution in an objective
evaluation. The subjective perception of the threat may align with
the objective evaluation, or it may outpace a correct objective
evaluation of the threat's seriousness. If the threat is perceived as
more serious than it actually is, the perception of the threat may
explain the increased likelihood that a treason charge will be

211.

See text accompanying notes 119-24.

212.

See, e.g., Ralph M. Carney, The Enemy Within: A Social History of Treason,

in CITIZEN ESPIONAGE: STUDIES IN TRUST AND BETRAYAL 19, 37 (Theodore R. Sarbin,
Ralph M. Carney & Carson Eoyang eds., 1994).
Societies conduct their affairs with an understanding that events can take
place that may cause the society to cease to exist. And these threats can come
from internal as well as external sources. This fear of national harm is the
psychological underpinning for the context of national security. The laws of
treason, espionage, sedition, and mutiny are established to lessen the fear
about the internal threat by declaring that betrayal will be severely punished.
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employed, though perception alone cannot normatively justify a
treason charge.
George Fletcher discounts the affective power of subjective
perceptions of the threat's nature. He writes, "Treason belongs to an
era in which crimes were understood primarily as personal moral
dramas."2 13
He argues, "treason has declined because in the
pragmatic thinking of the West, we no longer perceive great symbolic
messages in criminal action. . . . The decline of treason expresses a
general shift in our culture away from symbolic struggles toward the
systematic and scientific control of violence. ' 214
Specifically
addressing 9/11, he claims, "Those who perpetrated the attacks of
9/11 saw them as symbolic victories against the despised values of the
West. We saw them as the malicious homicide of roughly three
thousand people and the meaningless destruction of the twin
2 15
towers."
These comments fit neatly with Fletcher's thesis, but they ignore
reality. Fletcher fails to acknowledge that though treason has
symbolic aspects, it may have uses beyond symbolism. Harsh and
public punishment of traitors may serve as an effective deterrent
against future treasons. 216 More pointedly, Fletcher ignores the fact
that U.S. governmental leaders have framed the conflict with Al
Qaeda in precisely the symbolic terms that Fletcher claims the West
has eschewed. President Bush and others in his administration
repeatedly characterized the conflict as one against "evil" forces. 217
President Bush also explicitly likened it to World War 11.2 18 Thus, in

213.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1627-28.
214.
Id. at 1628.
215.
Id.
216.
See infra text accompanying note 251.
217.
See, e.g., Peter Baker, President Who Sees in Absolutes Awaits Voters'
Definitive Answer, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2006, at A01 (noting that President Bush's
world "is a world of absolutes" and quoting him as saying "I view this as a struggle of
good versus evil" regarding the war on terrorism); President George W. Bush, State of
the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/2002/
ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/ (coining the term "axis of evil" in the following
statement: "States like [North Korea, Iran, and Iraq], and their terrorist allies,
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world."); cf. Craig Gilbert,
Parties Divided by Language on Terror; Candidates' Word Choices Might Reflect
Different Views of What Battle Entails,MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 29, 2007, at Al.
It is clear in the '08 campaign that Republicans are more apt to frame the war
on terror in epic terms-as a clash of civilizations-than their Democratic
counterparts. Echoing President Bush, they liken the conflict to the great 20th
century struggles against fascism and communism-a battle to save the West.
Id.
218.
See, e.g., Tim Harper, Bush Likens Terror Fight to WWII, TORONTO STAR,
June 3, 2004, at A10 (describing President Bush's graduation speech at the U.S. Air
Force Academy); Ron Hutchenson, Bush Says Iraq Conflict, Like WWII, a 'Crucial'Test,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 31, 2005, at 3A ("Speaking to a crowd of sailors and
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the wake of 9/11 the Bush Administration framed the "War on
Terrorism" as an existential struggle. A struggle that is perceived as
existential-the forces of good battling to survive against the forces of
evil-is laden with symbolism. In this environment, a citizen's
actions in support of the "evil" enemy can be viewed through the same
symbolic lens, with the actions dramatized as betrayal of the politya conception in line with the historic conception of treason. Contra
Fletcher, symbolism is not incompatible with "the systematic and
scientific control of violence. '219 Leaders can layer symbolism over a
mechanized, high-tech, and violent conflict.
Israel provides a further example of deployment of symbolism to
describe and explain a conflict. Israel has mythologized its founding,
existence, and continued defense in existential terms. The attacks
Israel suffered from its neighbors in 1967 and 1973 might rightly
have been viewed as existential-determining the continued
existence of the state-due to the magnitude of forces arrayed against
Israel. The 2006 conflict with Hezbollah did not inflict nearly the
same amount of damage on Israel, and Hezbollah did not have the
same firepower as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in past wars. Hezbollah
displayed considerably more firepower than anticipated, however,
and throughout the conflict, Israel feared that Hezbollah's patrons,
Iran and Syria, would provide the group with more-and more
powerful-weapons or authorize the group to use the weapons it had
already received. 22 0 Psychologically, the conflict troubled and shook
Israelis because it was the first major foreign attack on Israel since
the 1991 Gulf War. The information about and encouragement to
strike targets south of Haifa-twenty miles into Israel proper-that
Bishara allegedly provided inflicted particular harm on the Israeli
22 1
psyche by disabusing Israelis of notions of safe zones within Israel.
Foreign press reports noted that "[ploliticians and pundits crowded
television studios [in Israel] to argue that Israel was fighting for its
survival in its battle to wipe out [Hezbollah]."222 Whether or not this

Marines near San Diego, Bush described the Iraq war and World War II as crucial
tests of American resolve in the face of evil.").
219.
Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88, at 1628.
220.
See, e.g., Erlanger & Oppel, supra note 209 (describing the nature of
weapons and other equipment and training provided by Syria and Iran to Hezbollah).
221.
See Ellingwood, supra note 114 ("Police believe Bishara counseled
Hezbollah on wartime strategy against Israel, including recommending that its fighters
fire rockets south of the port city of Haifa ....Israelis were especially shaken when
longer-range weapons hit Haifa and points south of the city ....
").
222.
McCarthy, supra note 114; see also Steven Erlanger, Left or Right, Israelis
Are Pro-War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at 1.
Abroad, Israel is criticized for having overreacted and for causing
disproportionate damage to Lebanon and its civilian population and even for
indiscriminate bombing. But within Israel, the sense is nearly universal that
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was the case in reality, Israel was fighting for its existence in rhetoric
and in psychology.
In contrast, Britain throughout the twentieth century has
conceived of terrorism as a law enforcement problem. Britain dealt
with the decades of conflict and terrorist violence stemming from the
223
Northern Ireland unrest with (sometimes extreme) police tactics.
It authorized harsh interrogations and detentions, but with
characteristic British stoicism, the authorities and society in general
downplayed the scope and threat of the violence. The country's
response to the 7/7 bombings displayed this historical approach to
terrorism. Although the country was clearly shocked when suicide
bombers blew up three Tube trains and a London bus during the
morning rush hour, authorities emphasized the police efforts to find
the perpetrators (in the end a futile effort since the attacks were
suicide bombings), and the attacks were not framed in existential
terms. 224 When it became clear that the attackers were homegrown
British Muslims with Al Qaeda links, discussion ensued about the
causes of such hatred among Britain's own citizens. 225 But unlike the
U.S. and Israeli responses, Britons viewed the London attacks as just
another in a long line of terrorist attacks that the United Kingdom
had faced,2 26 and they did not dramatize the attacks as symbolic of a
larger existential struggle or threat to the United Kingdom.
As these contrasts between the United States and Israel on the
one hand and the United Kingdom on the other illustrate, it seems
that greater willingness to employ treason charges might correlate

unlike its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, this war is a matter of survival, not
choice, and its legitimacy is unquestioned.
Id.; Dion Nissenbaum, Israel;A Hard-LineAttitude; Little Sympathy for the Lebanese;
Most Israelis View the War as a Battle for National Survival and Support the Military's
Action, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 30, 2006, at 7A (reporting on opinion polls in
Israel); Naftali Tamir, We Fight for Our Survival, HERALD SUN (Austl.), Aug. 3, 2006,
at 20 (Israeli ambassador to Australia).
223.
See, e.g., Ian Burrell, UN Attacks Britain's Rights Record, INDEPENDENT
(London), Nov. 20, 1998, at 13; Sarah Lyall, Britain Found to Violate Rights in Ulster
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2001, at A6.
224.
See, e.g., Blair: They Will Never Succeed, GUARDIAN (London), July 8, 2008,
at 14 ("There will now be the most intense police and security action to make sure we
bring those responsible to justice. I would also pay tribute to the stoicism and resilience
of the people of London who have responded in a way typical of them.") (quoting Prime
Minister Tony Blair, Statement from Downing Street (July 7, 2005)).
225.
See, e.g., Jon Ungoed-Thomas, The 'Hearts and Minds' Battle for British
Muslims that Failed, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Aug. 13, 2006, at 15; Burhan Wazir,
7/7: One Year On, TIMES (London), July 4, 2006, at 4.
226.
See, e.g., Christine Spolar & Tom Hundley, Repeat London Bombing
Fizzles; Devices on 3 Trains, Bus Don't Detonate, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 2005, at C1
("London Mayor Ken Livingstone, recalling the extended bombing campaigns of the
Irish Republican Army in the 1970s and 1980s, said a second terrorist strike was 'not
surprising.' 'We got through that,' he said of the IRA terror campaign, 'and we will get
through this."').
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with how a country conceptualizes the terrorist threat. 227 If the
country perceives itself to be fighting an existential conflict either for
its survival or against an "evil" enemy, then symbolism becomes very
important. The historic pedigree of treason as a crime founded on
betrayal of an owed duty or allegiance meshes with this symbolism.
When a state perceives itself to be in greatest danger-as when it
confronts an existential threat-it expects and demands the greatest
faithfulness and support from its citizens and residents.
If an
individual breaks the bond of allegiance at precisely the point when
the state feels most threatened, the state may feel the need to
demand the expected bonds of allegiance by charging treason when
they are breached. Treason's historical focus on betrayal hits at the
heart of why the traitor's offense is so troubling to the state-the
offense itself may be harmful, but the fact of an enemy from within
those who are supposed to support and even die for the state signals
vulnerability at the precise moment when the state needs to project
strength vis-A-vis the external enemy. 228 Thus, regardless of the
magnitude of the external threat, the nature and conceptualization of
the threat as existential increases the level of symbolic conflict, which
may prompt the state to respond to a symbolic attack with a symbolic
charge and punishment-a reassertion of the demand for the
allegiance of its own residents.
D. Loyalty
The analysis of the preceding section also casts doubt on the
fourth reason offered for treason's supposed demise: the loyalty to the
state that is a necessary precondition to treason has no place in the
modern world. Margaret Boveri, writing about treason in 1956,
focused on the "atomisation of society." 229 George Fletcher in 1993
did not agree that loyalty had devolved quite so far as to rest solely on
individuals, but he does claim that the state has lost its place as a

227.
It may be that Britain has not charged the former Guantanamo detainees
with treason purely due to evidentiary problems, see, e.g., Rozenberg, supra note 108;
Steele, supra note 108, so this non-prosecution critique primarily applies to Omar
Bakri Mohammed, the Islamic cleric discussed above, and others who may have
assisted the 7/7 bombers.
228.
Cf.Carney, supra note 212, at 36.
Sovereignty is like a fabric, and betrayals, great or small, create a tear that
could ultimately unravel the society. From early Roman times to the present,
citizens are expected to cause no damage to the integrity of their country of
birth. This is a common duty taught to citizens of all nations. In this context,
treason is the worst of crimes.
Id.
229.

MARGRET BOVERI, TREASON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 391 (Jonathan

Steinberg trans., 1961) (1956).
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locus of loyalty. Fletcher writes, "In a world of dual and conflicting
loyalties, the state's demand for exclusive loyalty is rapidly losing its
grip." 230 From the perspective of the individual, Fletcher argues, "In
a world history of conquest, taking slaves, free-flowing migration, and
expelled refugees, the union of state and society has long been a
myth. The objects of our loyalty are families, tribes, or communities
that at best overlap haphazardly with organized political
authority. '23 ' Fletcher believes that the decline in focus on loyalty is,
however, mutual because, he argues, "[g]overnments seem no longer
to care about actual sentiments of loyalty. Of concern today are the
control and dissemination of information. ' 23 2 Thus, founded on the
idea of demise from mutual neglect, Fletcher claims, "[t]he crime of
treason to a nation-state can survive only if the principle 'thou shalt
not betray me' as applied to the state retains as much moral
coherence as the imperatives of interpersonal crime-for example,
233
'thou shalt not kill' and 'thou shalt not steal.'
Thankfully, society has not degraded so far as Fletcher suggests.
Three counterpoints challenge Fletcher's prediction that treason is
outmoded. First, treason is but one incarnation of betrayal, and
Fletcher and others recognize that the betrayal characteristic of
treason has analogues in personal relations.
Indeed, "[t]reason
operates against the background of the fundamental human need to
form social groups where members are trustworthy and loyal. 23 4
Other human relationships also suffer betrayals. Betrayal is the key
to acts such as adultery and idolatry, betrayal of a spouse and God,
respectively. 23 5 The same moral intuition that condemns these
personal betrayals also underlies treason. One commentator has
argued that the moral condemnation of treason stems from the unity
of the divine Roman emperor and the Roman state: "since the
emperor embodied the state, the state was also sacrosanct, and acts

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

FLETCHER, supranote 16, at 58.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 58.
Carney, supra note 212, at 20.
See FLETCHER, supranote 16, at 41.

The worst epithets are reserved for the sin of betrayal. Worse than murder,
worse than incest, betrayal of country invites universal scorn. Betrayal of a
lover is regarded by many as an irremediable breach. For the religious,
betrayal of God is the supreme vice. The specific forms of betrayal-adultery,
treason, and idolatry-all reek with evil.
Id.; see also NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, BETRAYALS AND TREASON: VIOLATIONS OF TRUST

AND LOYALTY 126 (Crime & Society Series, John Hagan et al. eds., 2001) ("Violations of
trust and loyalty on the personal level are commonly referred to as 'betrayal'.... For
example, marriage typically means sexual exclusivity. Violating that is interpreted as
betrayal ....).
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that defamed the state were desecrations that signified moral
'23 6
corruption.
Although adultery is no longer a prosecuted offense, there is no
reason to believe that the offense it gives to a victim is any less than
it was in prior eras. While moral condemnation of and indignation at
adultery and other personal betrayals continues, why would
treason-betrayal writ large-be spared the same condemnation?
Offense at and punishment of betrayal is a fundamental human
reaction at both the personal and the group level. In the state
context, "treason affronts the public trust. Betrayal threatens the
conditions for trust, diminishes the strength of the social contract,
and ultimately threatens the survival of the group. ' 237 Fletcher,
though recognizing the similarity between personal and public
betrayal, offers no persuasive explanation of why betrayal in one
realm-the personal realm-would remain a vital source of
condemnation, while betrayal in the public realm would prove no
affront, as he claims is the case. Contrary to his prediction, but
predictably when one realizes the continued private vitality of
condemnations of betrayal, governments in fact do "care about actual
238
sentiments of loyalty," as evidenced by treason's return.
Second, individual loyalty to one's state of citizenship may be
greater today than in centuries past because the benefits derived
from the state have increased. An individual in a modern democratic
state receives many sorts of benefits from being a member of the
social community. Benefits may include social services, healthcare,
unemployment insurance, and public goods, such as defense,
emergency services, public transportation, etc.
Because modern
states are more powerful than their predecessors, individuals are
required to have a greater connection to their states. Though this
connection may not always be positive (for example, widespread
enforcement of unpopular laws might breed discontent) and
familiarity may breed contempt, generally the benefits to be gained
from living in a modern state are great, suggesting that the cost of
treason would be higher than it was in the past when the state did
not offer as much to its citizens.
Finally, Fletcher is correct that the world today is full of
burgeoning sub-state identities, based on family, religion, ethnicity,
and other attributes. Fletcher notes, "We are witnessing ... increasing
demands for loyalty within smaller and smaller units of group
identification. The intense need to belong, the craving for reciprocal
attention and devotion, the quest for meaning in group action-all of

236.
237.
238.

Carney, supra note 212, at 24.
Id. at 20.
FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 59.
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these ever-present yearnings put pressure on our loyalties. '239 But
Fletcher ignores the fact that in the realm of international relationsprecisely the arena where national enemies appear and are
confronted-the state remains the primary actor. For centuries, states
have been the primary unit in international law-including laws
governing the use of force-and they remain so, despite recent
developments, particularly in the area of human rights, that empower
sub- and supra-state groups and individuals. 240
When acting
internationally, individuals are still conceptualized primarily by their
state of citizenship.
Passports and consulates are arranged by
citizenship, not family, ethnicity, or religion. Thus, a state's assertion
of its primacy as the locus of loyalty vis-A-vis foreign enemies follows a
centuries-old tradition and current practice of deference to states as the
major actors in international relations. 241 It should be unsurprising
then that states will punish disloyalty when it manifests as aid to the
states' enemies because the state is the unit that confronts foreign
enemies and enforces discipline internally in the service of its
international role, as discussed in the next part.

IV. THE POTENTIAL

EFFECTS OF TREASON PROSECUTIONS

The preceding Parts have offered an account of the reappearance
of treason prosecutions in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Israel, and an explanation of why predictions of treason's demise
were incorrect. This Part evaluates whether the reappearance of
treason in these democratic societies should be cause for concern, and
if so, under what circumstances. It identifies four possible benefits
and four possible dangers of treason prosecutions. The benefits and
dangers are in some sense converses of one another, which should
caution states contemplating a treason prosecution to consider not
just the benefit they hope to gain but also the potential downside of
the supposed benefit. These potential effects provide a framework for
evaluating whether the benefits of treason prosecutions outweigh the
potential dangers.

239.
Id. at 60.
240.
See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
241.
This is not to say that non-state and sub-state actors, and even individuals,
lack roles in international relations and international law. See generally Oona A.
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of InternationalLaw,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 502-04 (2005) (discussing how domestic actors, for example,
"nongovernmental advocacy groups," affect states' treaty commitment and compliance);
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing InternationalLaw Home, 35
Hous. L. REV. 623, 646-47 (1998) (discussing "transnational norm entrepreneurs"). I
merely mean to emphasize that when it comes to international political and legal
conceptions about the use of force, the state remains the primary relevant unit.
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A. PotentialBenefits of Treason Prosecutions
There are several possible positive effects of prosecuting treason.
First, treason's emphasis on the duty of allegiance owed by the
accused traitor can reinforce societal identity. The prosecution
directly reinforces the duty of allegiance and social cohesion by
242
and
reminding the rest of society that the allegiance is due
demonstrating that the state will enforce the allegiance owed to it.
For example, in the press conference announcing Gadahn's
indictment, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty declared,
"Today's indictment should serve as notice that the United States will
Betrayal
....
protect itself against all enemies, foreign and domestic
243
of our country will bring severe consequences."
The prosecution also can reinforce the identity indirectly by
highlighting the enemy's identity and showing that the state opposes
the enemy. The identification of an enemy allows a state's leaders to
take advantage of the in-group bias that results from the perception
of an out-group "other." Social psychological literature has long
documented the group reinforcement effect that results from
For
identification of an other, particularly a threatening one.
example, studies show that
being told that one belongs to a particular
another-even if one has never seen or met any
group-is enough to make the individual prefer
This group is perceived as better, friendlier,
244
stronger than other groups.

242.

group as opposed to
other members of that
the group over others.
more competent and

See, e.g., BEN-YEHUDA, supranote 235, at 108.

Conflict ... is a time for crystallization of internal conformity in the face of
challenges to the state. During such periods, state definitions of trust and
loyalty expand and harden, and what otherwise would be considered as normal
activity may become defined as treason or sedition. In times of conflict, nationstates tend to increase restrictions, which also increases the temptation to
violate them.
Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 41 ("Precisely because national betrayal is no longer
clearly perceived, the courts and other officials overcompensate for public doubts with
apparently excessive punishment.").
Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, et al., U.S. Dept. of Justice,
243.
Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Indictment of U.S. Citizen for Treason and
Material Support Charges for Providing Aid and Comfort to al Qaeda (Oct. 11, 2006)
(transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag-speech.
061011.htm).
Daniel Druckman, Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social
244.
Psychological Perspective, 38 MERSHON INT'L STUD. REV. 43, 48 (1994) (citing
experiments by Tajfel and Brewer and noting the well-known study of group bias based
on whether one is an over- or under-estimator of dot patterns); see also Mark Schafer,
Cooperative and Conflictual Policy Preferences: The Effect of Identity, Security, and
Image of the Other, 20 POL. PSYCHOL. 829, 832 (1999) ("Ingroup identity is
enhanced.., if the members of the outgroup have significantly different characteristics
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Throughout history the existence of an external enemy has served to

unify the state against which the enemy is arrayed, causing
intrasocietal rifts to decrease in importance with the reminder that
The external enemy
external threats pose greater dangers. 245
provokes feelings of nationalism-group identity writ large in the
social psychological literature-because "[a]ttacks on the ingroup are
threatening not only because they are dangerous, but because they
are attacks on the fundamental identity of its individual
members. '246 In-group identity is further bolstered in the wake of a
terrorist attack by a "rally around the flag" effect: a boost in the
popularity of the government in power resulting from an
international attack or military event.2 4 7 Society "rallies around" the

from the members of the ingroup (in terms of language, ethnicity, and so on) and
especially if the outgroup is seen as a threat to the ingroup.").
245.
See BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 235, at 124.
Charges of disloyalty and treason can be effective symbolic tools in the hands of
determined leaders in campaigns to redefine moral boundaries and bolster
their own agendas. During conflict, the boundaries between patriotism and
treason, between loyalty and betrayal, become clearly delineated; rhetoric
creates a social reality where good is pitted against evil, with no middle ground.
Id.
Schafer, supra note 244, at 831.
246.
247.
Early research and theorizing on the "rally around the flag effect" studied
the United States, and particularly the effect on presidential popularity of war and
other military confrontation. In this context, John E. Meuller explained, "In general, a
rally point must be associated with an event which 1) is international and 2) involves
the United States and particularly the President directly; and it must be 3) specific,
dramatic, and sharply focused." John E. Mueller, PresidentialPopularityfrom Truman
to Johnson, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 18, 21 (1970). For additional support, see Brett
Ashley Leeds & David R. Davis, Domestic Political Vulnerability and International
Disputes, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 814, 816 (1997):
Although the in-group/out-group hypothesis was developed with small groups
in mind, political scientists have argued that the theory applies at the level of
the nation-state as well, that conflict in the international system unites a
divided domestic population. The salient and potent danger of a foreign
adversary quells domestic dissension and increases nationalist feelings and
government support. The 'rally around the flag' effect, a tendency discovered in
the United States for public approval of the president to increase following
involvement in major international events, is cited as empirical support for this
proposition.
Id.; cf. Diana Richards et al., Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of
Force: A Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 504, 507-08 (1993)
(discussing the "rally around the flag' effect as proof of the applicability of the ingroup/out-group hypothesis to nation-states and noting that "[ilt is only a small step
from this to the conclusion that state leaders would deliberately use force externally in
an effort to divert attention from internal problems."). I do not mean to suggest that
the states discussed herein have launched fights against terrorism as diversionary
wars but merely that the literature has shown that leaders understand how external
threats affect domestic politics and so can evoke such threats to produce a desired
effect, such as increasing feelings of national unity.
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government in power as the government confronts the external
threat. After a terrorist attack, government leaders evoke the event
to remind the public of the unity required to face the threat. 248
Such a boost in societal unity can only be beneficial if the enemy
is clearly and properly defined as the members of a terrorist group
like Al Qaeda. Misdefinition of the enemy by ethnic or religious
characteristics could cause grave harm to both society and individuals
by encompassing not just members of the threatening group but also
loyal individuals who share ethnic or religious characteristics with
the group's members. 249 The danger is heightened because leaders
who may in fact provide the correct definition of the enemy do not
retain sole control over the discourse and framing of the enemy; other
independent actors can misdefine the enemy along ethnic, racial, or
religious lines, leading to grave abuses against innocents. 250 If the
danger of misdefinition is avoided, however, and the enemy is
correctly defined as only members of the organization actually
threatening the state, then identification of the external other can
promote inclusion and unity with minority groups by clearly
including them in the definition of the state that is being defended.
The external threat becomes more important than other intrasocietal
rifts that might otherwise gain or might previously have had
prominence.
Second, treason prosecutions may deter future treasons-the
25 1
deterrence rationale present elsewhere in criminal law.
Deterrence can result from the demonstration that the state will
prosecute traitors and that severe punishment can accompany a
conviction. This is deterrence through fear or a desire to avoid
punishment. More positively, prosecution could deter treasons by
reinforcing societal identity and cohesion, as just discussed, thus
making individuals less prone to a desire to betray their community.

248.
Cf. Richards et al., supra note 247, at 507 ("It is widely accepted that
international conflict is a unifying force for nations and that state leaders often use
external enemies to rally domestic support.").
249.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON
IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11

ATTACKS (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf
(describing critically the rounding up of Arab and Muslim men in the New York City
area in the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent maltreatment to which they were
subjected).
250.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 249, at 157-64
(detailing harsh treatment of detainees at the Metropolitan Detention Center after
9/11); Caroline E. Mayer, Passenger Fears, Bias Laws May Clash; Terrorism Raises
Legal Concerns, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2001, at A12.
251.
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649-50 (2008) ("[Plunishment
is justified under one or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence,
and retribution." (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991)), reh'g denied,
129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).
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Third, treason prosecutions can be satisfying to the society
whose members have been betrayed by the traitor-the retribution
rationale that is at least one basis for criminal law. 252 The particular
military harm the traitor's actions have caused may be unclear, but
the traitor often seeks to harm his home society by a demonstration
effect.
That is, it is demoralizing to see one's fellow citizen
associating with or aiding the enemy. In this instance, treason
prosecutions allow the society to strike back at the traitor and to do
so while emphasizing the particular reason for its anger-the
betrayal-which may be greater than the actual military harm the
traitor has caused. The in-group identification that is sparked by the
external enemy makes a symbol-laden response, the punishment of
the betrayal itself, additionally satisfying as a reinforcement of group
25 3
solidarity.
Finally, treason might clarify the procedural system under which
some terrorist acts should be addressed and in the process satisfy
those with divergent views about the appropriate framework for
handling terrorism. A major legal debate following the 9/11 attacks
has centered on whether terrorism should be dealt with as a military
issue or a criminal one. 254 Treason, however, bridges this divide.

252.
Id.
253.
Cf. Paul C. Stern, Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?, 16 POL.
PSYCHOL. 217, 221 (1995) ("When the threatened group is a nation-state, the prediction
is that a foreign attack or military threat leads to stronger identification with the
nominal nation of the nation-state and increased support for the regime in power.").
254.
See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1094-96 (2008)
(describing historical evolution of U.S. policy toward terrorism from a law enforcement
model to a military model). Compare David Held, Violence, Law, and Justice in a
Global Age, in UNDERSTANDING SEPTEMBER 11, at 92, 101 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds.,
2002) ("[T]errorists must be treated as criminals and not glamorized as military
adversaries.") and Harold Hongju Koh, Preserving American Values: The Challenge at
Home and Abroad, in THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11, at 143, 150 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001) ("Terrorist
acts have been committed by international criminals who belong to an international
criminal network that uses textbook criminal techniques. Time-tested methods of law
enforcement remain the best tools to bring those criminals to justice."), with Seyla
Benhabib, Unholy Wars: Reclaiming Democratic Virtues After September 11, in
UNDERSTANDING SEPTEMBER 11, supra,at 241, 246.
The presence of an enemy who is neither a military adversary nor a
representative agent of a known state creates confusion as to whether it is the
police and other law enforcement agencies or the military who should take the
lead in the investigation and the struggle-the lines between acts of crime and
acts of war get blurred.
and Charles Hill, A Herculean Task: The Myth and Reality of Arab Terrorism, in THE
AGE OF TERROR, supra, at 81, 87.
Throughout the 1990s the U.S. relied heavily on law enforcement mechanisms
to try to investigate and punish terrorists. The results, predictably, were
interminable legalistic entanglements that focused on the lower suspects and
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Treason is prosecuted in the normal, civilian criminal justice system
but is premised on the existence of a war, or at least a military
conflict of the same scope and intensity as a war. 255 It neither
precludes a military response to severe terrorist attacks nor departs
from the regular criminal prosecution system in dealing with
individuals captured in the conflict who owe allegiance to the
capturing states. In the United States, for example, Yasser Esam
Hamdi, Jose Padilla, and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, all of whom
256
were held as enemy combatants, could have been tried for treason.
Hamdi and Padilla are U.S. citizens, and al-Marri was a lawful
resident at the time of his detention. 257 All owed allegiance to the
United States, and thus could have been subject to treason charges

left the masterminds alone. Courtroom standards of evidence served the
interests of international terrorist networks and the states that supported
them.
But see Chesney & Goldsmith, supra, at 1081.
During the past five years, the military detention system has instituted new
rights and procedures designed to prevent erroneous detentions, and some
courts have urged detention criteria more oriented toward individual conduct
than was traditionally the case. At the same time, the criminal justice system
has diminished some traditional procedural safeguards in terrorism trials and
has quietly established the capacity for convicting terrorists based on criteria
that come close to associational status. Each detention model, in short, has
become more like the other.
Id.
HURST, supra note 78, at 3-4.
255.
Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
256.
("Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional
tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime.").
Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of this Court, asserts that captured
enemy combatants (other than those suspected of war crimes) have
traditionally been detained until the cessation of hostilities and then released.
That is probably an accurate description of wartime practice with respect to
enemy aliens. The tradition with respect to American citizens, however, has
been quite different. Citizens aiding the enemy have been treated as traitors
subject to the criminal process.
Id. at 558-59 (citation omitted). See generally Benjamin A. Lewis, Note, An Old Means
to a Different End: The War on Terror, American Citizens ... and the Treason Clause,
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1215 (2006) (arguing that Hamdi and Padilla should have been
charged with treason). But cf. Suzanne Kelly Babb, Note, Fear and Loathing in
America: Application of Treason Law in Times of National Crisis and the Case of John
Walker Lindh, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1721 (2003) (arguing that the government could not
have proven that Lindh committed treason and that treason charges in the war on
terrorism would be dangerous).
257.
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509-10 (noting Hamdi's U.S. citizenship); A1-Marri
v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that al-Marri was an alien residing
lawfully in the United States at the time he was arrested), cert. granted sub nom. AlMarri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008), and vacated and remanded with instructions
to dismiss as moot sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1054 (2009); Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting Padilla's U.S. citizenship).
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for violations of that allegiance. 258 Such charges could have avoided
the debates and litigation that followed from their indefinite
detention as enemy combatants. In these particular cases and more
generally, treason would be viewed as more legitimate than
alternative procedural regimes, like Combatant Status Review
Tribunals, that are designed in an ad hoc manner to deal with
suspected terrorists when the issue arises.
For example, a
Washington Post editorial called Gadahn's indictment a "constructive
development" because "[u]nlike the murky terrain governing the
holding of American citizens as enemy combatants, treason is defined
in the Constitution. So there's no doubt as to the government's
authority to pursue its case or the propriety of doing so."' 25 9 Treason
could not be charged against all of those held as enemy combatants,
rather only against those who owed some allegiance, either
permanent or temporary, to the United States. 26 0 But at least in
those cases, treason charges would likely be viewed as more
legitimate because they occur in the normal criminal justice system,
with evidentiary rules and standards of proof well established in nonconflict times. At the same time, treason should appease proponents
of treating terrorism as a war because treason presupposes a war, or
at least an armed conflict approaching the level of a war, and thus
would not undermine the rationale for using military force against
the implicated terrorist group.
Because treason could only possibly be charged against a small
percentage of those the United States has detained or continues to
detain, it is not a panacea for the problem of Guantanamo Bay. It is
beyond this Article's scope to delve far into the ongoing debates about
how to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center and particularly
whether it will be necessary to create new national security courts to
deal with the remaining detainees. However, treason prosecutions,
with the regularized criminal process and heightened procedural
protections they require, may prove useful if national security courts
are created. Treason prosecutions have the potential to minimize two
dangers that commentators have identified with regard to national

258.
But see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("They apply only to
citizens accused of being enemy combatants, who are detained within the territorial
jurisdiction of a federal court. This is not likely to be a numerous group; currently we
know of only two, Hamdi and Jose Padilla."). Historical evidence, discussed above,
demonstrates that under pre-Constitution English common law, allegiance, and
therefore the ability to violate it and commit treason, extended beyond citizens to
individuals resident in Britain. A1-Marri would fall within the Treason Clause under
this historical interpretation, though Justice Scalia's Hamdi dissent would exclude
him.
259.
Editorial, The Treason Puzzle: The Administration Tries a New Legal Tack
Against Terrorism, WASH. POST, Oct. 16,
2006, at A20,
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/15/AR2006101500730.html.
260.
See supra note 145-47 and accompanying text.
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security courts. "The first danger is that the executive's power to
conduct war will displace the area previously assumed to fall within
the criminal justice system." 261 Treason prosecutions minimize this
danger because one of treason's predicates is the existence of a war
or, at a minimum, an armed conflict equivalent to a war, thus
bridging the war-or-criminal process dichotomy. The Constitution
provides treason as a way for at least a small part of the executive's
power to conduct war to be mediated through the criminal justice
system. A second danger is that "the criminal justice system will
become increasingly like the parallel track" of national security courts
in that "it will lose the civil liberties protections, checks and balances,
and oversight by independent actors (e.g., judges) that we normally
associate with the criminal process in the United States. '262 Treason
minimizes this danger because the Constitution's Treason Clause
provides specific procedural and evidentiary requirements for treason
that establish a non-derogable floor of protections in treason
prosecutions.
Therefore, the danger of slippage away from the
"protections ...we normally associate with the criminal process ' 26 3 is
nearly impossible in the treason context and is certainly less than it
264
is with any other criminal charges.
B. PotentialDetriments of Treason Prosecutions
In contradistinction to these four potential benefits from treason
prosecutions, there are also four major potential downsides. First,
using treason prosecutions in the context of a terrorist group could
dignify or build up the perceived threat from terrorism to an
unjustified level. Treason in the United States and the United
Kingdom requires either a levying of war or giving aid and comfort to
an enemy. For the United States, the enemy in question has always
been a foreign state. 265 The Gadahn treason indictment expands the

261.
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional
Change: From PartisanEntrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 489, 523 (2006).
262.
Id. at 524.
263.
Id.
264.
Cf. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 254, at 1101-06 (discussing the
interpretive modifications prosecutors have made to broaden the scope of liability
under the material support and conspiracy laws for terrorism cases).
265.
In the U.S. context, George Fletcher highlighted this point in 2004 and
queried whether the United States would ever see another formally declared war and
thus would ever have another treason prosecution. But his doubtfulness seems to have
been overtaken by events, namely the Gadahn indictment wherein the government has
conceptualized Al Qaeda as an "enemy." See Law, Loyalty, and Treason, supra note 88
at 1612.
According to a persuasive line of cases, the concept of the 'enemy' applies only
to enemies in a declared war. The armies of North Korea, North Vietnam, the
Taliban, Afghanistan, Iraq-none of these met the technical standard of being
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concept of enemy to include a non-state actor, namely Al Qaeda;
similarly, the Bishara investigation would expand the idea of enemy
in Israel to include Hezbollah.
Legally, this shift is not unprecedented. Blackstone explained
that treason could be committed by aiding pirates:
As to foreign pirates or robbers, who may happen to invade our coasts,
without any open hostilities between their nation and our own, and
without any commission from any prince or state at enmity with the
crown of Great Britain, the giving them any assistance is also clearly
treason: either in the light of adhering to the public enemies of the king
26 6
and kingdom, or else in that of levying war against his majesty.

Pirates in this context were dangerous, non-state actors, not
dissimilar to some of today's terrorist groups. Indeed, Harold Koh
has argued that the "legal state of affairs" with respect to terrorists
today "most closely resembles one we experienced at the founding of
the Republic," when "pirates, privateers and other early terrorists
posed as great a threat to our nation as sovereign states bent on
war."267 This historical extension of treason to pirates is important
not just for its extension of treason to non-state actors, but also for its
pragmatic approach to the magnitude of the threat posed by pirates.
Piracy in Blackstone's era through to the early years of the United
States was not the anachronism it seems today (or at least until
recently), 268 but instead was a major threat to the world's powerful
states. The U.S. Constitution specifically mentions piracy, giving
Congress the power to "define and punish Piracies," which it did in
1790.269 Shortly thereafter, the United States engaged in military
hostilities with the Barbary pirates, who repeatedly seized U.S. ships
The equivalence between the
and held them for ransom. 270
magnitude of the threat posed by pirates and the threat posed by
foreign state enemies is key to understanding Blackstone's inclusion
of pirates as enemies for the purposes of treason.

enemies in a declared war. Indeed, with the entire congressional practice of
declaring war in limbo, one wonders whether we will ever witness another
American war formally declared in advance.

Id.
266.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 136, at *83.
267.
Koh, supra note 254, at 158.
268.
Resurgent piracy off the coast of Somalia has prompted the United States
and NATO to deploy military vessels to patrol a naval corridor to protect shipping. See,
e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia's Pirates Flourish in a Lawless Nation, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2008, at Al (discussing Somalia's booming pirate economy); Caroline Wyatt,
Navy Shoots Pirate Suspects Dead, BBC NEWS, Nov. 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hiluknews/7725771.stm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (describing deadly incident
between U.K. Royal Navy vessel and Somali pirates).
See Koh, supra note 254, at 158-59; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-61
269.
(LexisNexis2009) (criminalizing piracy and privateering).
270.
See, e.g., MICHAEL B. OREN, POWER, FAITH, AND FANTASY: AMERICA IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 51-79 (2007).
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This historical background clarifies that the element of change in
applying treason to today's terrorists is not the equation of non-state
threats with state-based threats.
In some circumstances, as
discussed below, this equivalence may be warranted.
But the
potential expansion and danger comes from the possibility that in the
future the precedent of applying treason in the context of modern
non-state actors may be applied against terrorist groups that pose
much less of a threat than Al Qaeda to the United States or
Hezbollah to Israel. Comparatively less powerful and threatening
groups could be successfully dealt with in the normal criminal
system. But the application of treason to terrorist groups will "lien
about like a loaded weapon 271 to be applied to comparatively nonthreatening terrorist groups when treason's application would
exaggerate the threat posed to the prosecuting state. Thus, as a
counterpoint to the potential benefit of reinforcing societal cohesion, a
treason prosecution could exaggerate the threat from a terrorist
group and divert energy and resources to dealing with the group as a
state-like war enemy, when the more successful strategy would be to
address it through less drastic criminal measures, such as material
272
support.
A second and related potential problem with treason
prosecutions is what they signal about the society that chooses to
prosecute the traitor. The Supreme Court in Cramer noted that the
United States had avoided using treason because it had been
"singularly confident of external security and internal stability. '273
Does the revival of treason in the United States, Israel, and
potentially the United Kingdom signal that the states are now either
not secure, not stable, or both? Though there may be beneficial
effects to the society of prosecuting treason, as discussed above,
treason prosecutions may also signal the government's concern about
additional traitors. If the prosecution is undertaken for deterrent and
society-reinforcing reasons, then the government might be signaling
(unintentionally) that it believes there are potential traitors who need
to be deterred and citizens for whom the reinforcement of the

271.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
272.
There is, perhaps, a separate question whether it is faithful to the
Constitution to charge acts that could be charged as treason as a different crime, like
material support, to which the two-witness requirement does not apply. A full
examination of how treason differs from, among other things, material support must
await additional research. As practically implicated in the cases at issue here, however,
it should be noted that courts have rejected an attempted defense based on the fact
that the defendants' actions constituted and should have been charged as treason and
that the defendants' conviction was invalid because the prosecution failed to satisfy the
Treason Clause's two-witness requirement. United States v. Rosenberg et al., 195 F.2d
583, 609-11 (2d Cir. 1952).
273.
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 26 (1945).
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national identity and allegiance is necessary. Renewed treason
prosecutions, particularly if they were to become more frequent,
might signal government paranoia-that is, a government that is
seen to need to reinforce its residents' allegiance in this manner may
thereby unnecessarily show its insecurity about its residents' loyalty
and about the magnitude of the threat from within. Despite the
intended deterrent effect of prosecution, the government might
actually signal weakness sufficient to spark, rather than deter,
additional treasons.
Third, a treason charge might tend to bias the adjudication of a
criminal case against the defendant. Other crimes with which the
traitor might be charged, like material support, sound more
antiseptic-a crime merely against the government. Treason, on the
other hand, has popular resonance and is imbued with the idea that
the accused has betrayed not just the government but the people, and
in the United States, the very people composing the jury. 274 Willard
Hurst notes that the mere accusation of treason carries "peculiar
intimidation and stigma" as compared to other crimes. 275 The
society-reinforcing effect of treason might slant the jury against the
defendant who allegedly has allied himself against them, not just
against an abstract entity. Although retribution is one potential
benefit of treason, retribution must be had only in the context of a
fair and constitutional criminal conviction-perhaps an unattainable
goal in a treason case because of the possibility of bias. As the
Supreme Court has noted, of the rationales for punishment,
"retribution ...most often can contradict the law's own ends. ' 2 76
A final potential problem with treason prosecutions is that
treason is a death-penalty-eligible crime in both the United States

274.
See United States v. Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
("The murderer kills only his victim while the traitor violates all the members of his
society, all the members of the group to which he owes his allegiance."). The
Rosenbergs were charged with espionage, not treason, but the judge's sentiment is apt.
See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 136, at *75, calling treason "the highest civil crime,
which (considered as a member of the community) any man can possibly commit."
275. Treason-PartII, supra note 79, at 424. Hurst, however, draws the opposite
conclusion about how a treason charge would bias a jury. He argues that the fact that
treason is a death-eligible crime would make juries unlikely to convict. Id. at 423.
The barbarous or oppressive penalties which were once a distinguishing mark
of the crime have been abolished, but treason is still a capital crime; and thus it
may be of consequence whether the prosecutor can make out a case under that
heading, or is restricted to a lesser penalty under another charge. This is likely
to be a consideration only in most unusual cases, however; the history has been
one of decreasing penalties, not simply as a matter of humane policy, but
because juries are reluctant to convict on a capital charge.
Id.
276.

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008).
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and Israel. 277 Britain abolished the death penalty for treason and
piracy only in 1998.278
In the United States and Israel, the
punishment for treason may not be proportional to the crime, or
rather to the harm caused by the crime. 279 The U.S. Supreme Court

277.
In the United States, the death penalty for treason is specified in the
treason statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2001).
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or
adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States
or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned
not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and
shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.
Id. Treason does carry the death penalty in Israel, see Kershner, supra note 116;
McCarthy, supra note 114, but no one has ever been executed for treason. Glenn
Frankel, Israel Convicts Vanunu of Treason for Divulging A-Secrets to Paper, 7-Month
Trial of Former Nuclear Technician Conducted in Secrecy, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1988,
at A28; Kershner, supra note 116 (noting that Adolph Eichmann is the only person
Israel has civilly executed).
278.
Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37, § 36 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uklActs/actsl998/ukpga-19980037-en-4#pt2-pb3-11g36.
279.
See FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 42-43.
The language of treason and treachery incites passions. It is hard, in principle,
to know how to punish treason. Is it a crime worse than homicide, worse than
rape? If the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied in rape cases, does it
follow that it should be equally suspect in cases of treason? There is no law on
this question, for we lack an appropriate methodology for thinking about the
gravity of treason .... The theory of punishment does not mesh with the crime
when there is no tangible harm, no friction against the physical welfare of the
victim. Traitors betray, but their breach of faith is complete without anyone
suffering actual harm. Their disloyalty disturbs us, but not because of traces
left by their treachery in the physical world.
Id.; see also id. at 44 ("Without a theory to guide us, we are likely to fall prey to
emotional attacks on the disloyal. Breaching bonds of loyalty takes on the quality of an
absolute wrong, and no punishment seems excessive to counteract this fissure in the
ties that bind us together."); James G. Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan: The
Unconstitutionality of Executing Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 99,
103 (1983) (reviewing the Court's death penalty case law and arguing that "so long as
the government cannot prove that an aggravated murder resulted from the treasonous
act or acts, a convicted traitor should not die since no life has been taken and the
traitor is not as culpable as those convicted of aggravated murder"). But see Henry
Mark Holzer, Why Not Call It Treason?: From Korea to Afghanistan, 29 S.U. L. REV.
181, 221-22 (2002), for an argument criticizing the United States for not charging Jane
Fonda and John Walker Lindh, among others, for treason.
By not indicting Batchelor, Garwood, Fonda, and Walker for treason the United
States has ignored its constitutional mandate to prosecute those who may be
guilty of 'adhering to their enemies, giving aid and comfort.' By not indicting
these four citizens of the United States for treason, the government has not
confronted them with the prospect of death, as a consequence of betraying their
country and its people. This possibility-death is not only constitutionally
appropriate upon conviction of treason; it is morally imperative treatment for
those who would betray to its enemies the freest Nation ever to grace this
earth.
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has found the death penalty permissible only in a narrow range of
crimes that cause death. 28 0 Not all traitors necessarily cause death,
raising the question of whether the Supreme Court would make an
exception for treason, when it has refused to do so in other heinous
but non-death-causing contexts. 28 1 The Court specifically limited its
most recent pronouncement on the death penalty in Kennedy v.
Louisiana to "crimes against individual persons," stating that it
"do[es] not address, for example, crimes defining and punishing
treason, espionage, terrorism and drug kingpin activity, which are
offenses against the State. ' 28 2 If Adam Gadahn were caught, tried,
and convicted, prosecutors could seek the death penalty, which would
likely force an appellate review of whether death is proportional to
the crime in non-death-causing treason cases, as Gadahn's seems to
be. If Bishara were convicted, Israeli courts could sentence him to
death under the Israeli treason law. It would be an open question,
however, whether the sentence would be carried out. The only nonmilitary death penalty Israel has carried out was against Adolf
283
Eichmann.
The U.S. Supreme Court would face a difficult question in
evaluating the death penalty for non-death-causing treasons.
Although the Constitution does not specify any particular
punishment for treason, 284 the historical pedigree of imposing the

Id.
280.
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). Coker reversed a death
sentence for a rapist because
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare
with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.
Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not
include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The
murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the
victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding
conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and
irrevocability,' is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take
human life.
Id. (citations omitted); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 221 (1976) (upholding the
imposition of the death penalty for murder).
281.
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008) ("As it relates to
crimes against individuals ... the death penalty should not be expanded to instances
where the victim's life was not taken."); see also Posting of Lyle Denniston to
SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/death-penalty-barred-for-child-rape/ (June
25, 2008, 10:11 EST) ("The broad declaration that death sentences should be reserved 'for
crimes that take the life of the victim' will apply, the Court said, to crimes against
individuals-thus leaving intact, for example, a possible death sentence for treason.").
282.
28 S. Ct. at 2659.
283.
Kershner, supranote 116.
284.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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death penalty for treason runs deep: 28 5 death was the only prescribed
punishment for treason in the United States until 1862 when
Congress amended the treason statute to allow for imprisonment and
a fine in lieu of death. 28 6 But as in Israel, convictions and death
sentences in the United States have not resulted in executions.
Among the World War II traitors, some were sentenced only to
imprisonment; the others were sentenced to death, but by the grace of
28 7
executive clemency, none were actually executed.
If Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Kennedy v. Louisiana
continues to be the guiding death penalty precedent, then the views
of society-as embodied in "[e]volving standards of decency"-will
influence the outcome. 28 8 The legal propriety of the death penalty for
non-death-causing treason may well depend on the course and
outcome of the national debate about the death penalty in general, an
issue that sparks strong feelings from both proponents and
opponents. The debate's application to treason would depend on the

285.
Blackstone describes not just the fact of the death penalty's imposition for
treason in England, but the gory details of the precise manner of execution:
The punishment of high treason in general is very solemn and terrible. 1. That
the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or walk; though
usually . . . a sledge or hurdle is allowed, to preserve the offender from the
extreme torment of being dragged on the ground or pavement. 2. That he be
hanged by the neck, and then cut down alive. 3. That his entrails be taken out,
and burned, while he is yet alive. 4. That his head be cut off. 5. That his body
be divided into four parts. 6. That his head and quarters be at the king's
disposal.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 136, at *92; see also Carney, supra note 212, at 26.
Death did not end the punishment for treason. All lands and titles were
forfeited to the king, and heirs were tainted with the same infamy as the
traitor under the presumption that the corruption that led to the bill of
attainder was transmitted via the bloodline to male heirs. Only the wife and
daughters were spared ignominy by being allowed to keep a portion of the
wife's dowry. A traitor was stripped of all identity: physical, social, or civil. The
penalty for betrayal was the removal of all trace of existence.
Id.
286.
287.
288.

Watson, supra note 29, at 675.
See J.H. Leek, Treason and the Constitution, 13 J. POL. 604, 617 (1951).
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008).

Whether this requirement [of proportionality] has been fulfilled is determined
not by the standards that prevailed when the Eighth Amendment was adopted
in 1791 but by the norms that 'currently prevail.' The Amendment 'draw[s] its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.' This is because '[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not
merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard
itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of
society change.
Id. (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
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answers to profound questions about the meaning of treason in the
society. For example, is treason necessarily equivalent to murder?
An interesting contemporary perspective on treason's severity
relative to other crimes comes from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 28 9 The Guidelines assign treason the highest possible
base offense level-forty-three-if the "conduct is tantamount to
waging war against the United States. '290 The base offense level of
forty-three requires life imprisonment, regardless of the offender's
criminal history; 291 a death-qualified jury would, of course, be
necessary to impose the death penalty. Under the Guidelines, the
only other crimes to which the highest base offense level-and
mandatory life imprisonment-apply are first degree murder 292 and
"unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, or trafficking" large
quantities of substances including cocaine and heroin if "death or
serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance and...
the defendant committed the offense after one or more prior
convictions for a similar offense. '293 In contrast to these crimes,
which require death or, at the very least, serious bodily injury more
than once, the Guideline for treason does not require death or even
any bodily injury to result. Thus, the Guidelines suggest equivalence
between treason and murder.
Given the current trend toward prohibiting the death penalty for
crimes that do not result in death, permitting it for non-deathcausing treasons would seem anomalous. But perhaps the anomaly
could be justified. For example, the potential harm from a traitor's
actions extends to a far larger number of people than harm from a
crime against an individual; 294 additionally, due to the requirement
that there be an enemy, treason necessarily occurs in a time of crisis
that makes the state less willing or less able to tolerate harm. If this

289.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are, of course, now only advisory, not
binding, for federal judges. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005)
(holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are not binding on federal judges and are
instead only advisory).
290.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Ml.1(a)(1) (2008). The Manual's
choice of phrasing is interesting and raises the question of whether "waging war" is
intended to be coterminous with the treason prong of "levying war" or whether "waging
war" for Guidelines purposes could also encompass certain types of "aid and comfort"
treasons. Id. Section 2M1.1(a)(2) states that for all treasons not "tantamount to waging
war" the offense level is that "applicable to the most analogous offense." Id.
291.
Id. at ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table. For purposes of comparison, the base
offense level for providing material support to a terrorist organization is twenty-six. Id.
§ 2M5.3. This corresponds to a range of sixty-three to 150 months' imprisonment,
depending on the defendant's criminal history category. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing
Table.
292.
Id. § 2Al.1.
293.
Id. § 2D1.1.
294.
Cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008) ("Our concern here
is limited to crimes against individual persons. We do not address ... crimes defining
and punishing treason... which are offenses against the State." (emphasis added)).
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question arises in U.S. courts, the debate will be profound and fierce.
Thus, the major benefit of clarifying the procedural regime for dealing
with some terrorist suspects comes with a major difficultydetermining the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the death
penalty for non-death-causing crimes.
C. Reconciling the Balance Sheet
Applying the benefit-danger framework, are the recent treason
prosecution and considered prosecutions cause for concern?
Applying the first pairing-reinforcing societal cohesion versus
unjustifiably dignifying the enemy-to the current cases, the
potential harm from dignifying the enemy seems slim, whether or not
there has been any benefit in terms of societal cohesion. The Gadahn
prosecution, the likely Bishara prosecution, and the considered
prosecution of the British Guantanamo detainees have all arisen in
traditional war contexts that are exceptional only because the
opponent is a non-state actor. Gadahn broadcasts propaganda for Al
Qaeda, with which U.S. and NATO military forces have been engaged
in military conflict in Afghanistan since 2001.
The British
Guantanamo detainees were detained as part of the same conflict, in
which British troops are also fighting. Israel's treason investigation
into Bishara began with his actions during Hezbollah's major military
conflict with Israel in the summer of 2006.
All of these contexts look very similar to the traditional war
scenario in which treason has historically applied, with the consistent
difference that the enemy the alleged traitor is accused of aiding is
not another state but a terrorist organization. In the case of Al
Qaeda, numerous international organizations and legal scholars
recognized the equivalence between the 9/11 attacks and attacks
launched by a state. In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1368, which condemned the 9/11 attacks
and deemed them a "threat to international peace and security"
sufficient to invoke the U.S. "inherent right" of self-defense under
international law-a right formerly permitted only against attacks by
states. 295 NATO and the Organization of American States also
recognized the 9/11 attacks as armed attacks. 296 In the Israeli-

295.
296.

S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
The NATO Charter states:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked ....
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Palestinian context (though not specifically with regard to
Hezbollah), widely respected jurists on the International Court of
Justice have also noted, "There is ...nothing in the text of Article 51
[defining self-defense] that thus stipulates that self-defence is
available only when an armed attack is made by a State,"2 97 and that
the U.N. Charter, "in affirming the inherent right of self-defence, does
not make its exercise dependent upon an armed attack by another
State. '298
Thus, under international law, the terrorist groups
implicated in the treason prosecutions have already been recognized
as inflicting harm equivalent to that which could be inflicted by a
state. It is a small step-not an unjustified promotion in threat
characterization-to make the same recognition for the definition of
enemy for treason purposes.
So far the treason prosecutions have not strayed far beyond their
traditional context. In this situation, there is little risk that a treason
prosecution would exaggerate the threat posed by the terrorist
organization because the magnitude of the threat is indeed great.
But the recent treason cases harbor an as-yet-unrealized danger: by
extending treason to encompass aid to non-state enemies, treason
may be extended to aiding such groups in all circumstances, including
those less threatening than the traditional war context. 299 By

North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. The OAS
was more explicit, specifically declaring that "these terrorist attacks against the United
States of America are attacks against all American States." Christopher Greenwood,
InternationalLaw and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq,
4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 18 (2003) (quoting OAS statement).
297.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 207, 215 (July 9) (separate opinion
of Judge Higgins at para. 33).
298.
Id. at 242 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal at para. 6 (emphasis added)).
Additionally, Judge Kooijmans notes:
Resolutions 1368 . . . and 1373 ...recognize the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence without making any reference to an armed attack by a
State," which, he concludes, "is not excluded by the terms of Article 51" since
Article 51 does not specify that an "armed attack must come from another State
even if this has been the generally accepted interpretation for more than 50
years.

Id. at 229, 231 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans at para. 35).
299.
Particularly in the case of propagandists, there may be First Amendment
problems with prosecution for treason. See The Treason Puzzle, supra note 259.
Yet treason charges could come to pose civil liberties concerns of their own. The
Constitution cannot, by definition, be unconstitutional-yet its definition of
treason is so broad and vague that, were it merely written in statute, it would
probably be so .... Where exactly that bleeds into protected speech is no easy
question.
Id.; see also Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason's Return, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 229,
230
(2007),
available at
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/16/eichensehr.html
(discussing the application of the aid and comfort prong of treason to propagandists).
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allowing treason prosecutions for aid to terrorist groups when the
groups act like enemy states and conduct wars, the definition of
enemy has been expanded in a way that could be used to justify the
enemy designation when the threat posed by the terrorist group is not
so severe or state-like. 300 This redefinition creates the risk that the
government could exploit treason prosecutions for their societyreinforcing tendencies or other benefits when the threat to the state
is neither severe nor the traditional type posed by an enemy state.
Societies must guard against this risk.
As long as treason prosecutions remain limited to contexts in
which terrorist organizations pose the same scope and nature of
threat as states, then the possible benefits from the prosecutions will
outweigh the minimal or nonexistent cost of dignifying a terrorist
enemy. If a terrorist organization poses a state-like threat, then in
essence, it has promoted itself, justifying state-like enemy status
without any over-dramatization by the target state. If, however,
states begin to use treason prosecutions against terrorist
sympathizers outside of a war context, then the balance tips against
treason because of the extreme governmental and perhaps societal
weakness the prosecutions would evidence and because of the
likelihood that the government is exploiting treason precisely for the
society-reinforcing effects a treason prosecution can provoke.
This does not mean that governments cannot combat terrorist
organizations that are causing violence short of war; it just means
that in doing so the governments must use the other criminal tools at
their disposal, reserving treason only for when a terrorist
organization acts like a state waging war. 30 1 Under this framework,
Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have both demonstrated their state-like
destructive capacities, and thus "giving aid and comfort" to one of
these groups should be sufficient to support a treason charge. Aid to
less powerful groups and to groups that are not waging an armed
conflict of state-like magnitude with the prosecuting state, however,
would not constitute treason. For United States residents, for
example, aid to the Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo or the
Basque separatist group ETA would not be treasonous. But such
30 2
conduct could still be prosecuted as material support.
Turning to the second dyad-deterring other treasonous acts
versus signaling weakness-the effect of the current treason cases is

300.
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
301.
See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) ("[T]he treason offense is
not the only nor can it well serve as the principal legal weapon to vindicate our
national cohesion and security.").
302.
Both groups are designated foreign terrorist organization in the United
States. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (July 7, 2009), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/
123085.htm.
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unclear. The renewed specter of treason prosecutions was certainly a
surprise and perhaps is sufficient to deter additional individuals from
undertaking treasonous conduct in aid of terrorist enemies. But such
cases, particularly the Gadahn case, may also signal weakness.
Gadahn's propaganda broadcasts are embarrassing for the
government, but it is not clear that he is attracting any recruits or
causing significant harm. More importantly, neither Gadahn nor
Bishara have been apprehended, and both have continued to make
well-publicized statements against their home governments-adding
to their governments' annoyance and embarrassment, and
emphasizing the fact that the governments have not been able to
arrest them. The balance of factors in this analysis is unclear, but it
seems that there is at least some downside for Israel and the United
States stemming from their accused traitor's continued-and vocalfreedom.
The third set of opposing factors will often not provide clear
guidance because they will usually rise and fall in tandem. The value
to society of exacting retribution for the accused traitors' actions will
likely be greater than zero, but so will the magnitude or existence of
bias at trial.
One would imagine that the utility of exacting
retribution would increase if the accused traitor's crimes were
particularly heinous or if the accused traitor had a particularly high
profile. So too though would the likelihood and magnitude of bias in
the trial. Though not often determinative in the weighing of costs
and benefits, consideration of these factors is important for the rare
case in which one would clearly outweigh the other. For example, if
an accused Al Qaeda operative were to be tried in the Southern
District of New York or in an area where many of the residents have
family and friends serving in Afghanistan, then the risk of bias might
be extremely high, whereas the utility of retribution could still be
obtained if the trial were held in another venue.
The fourth dyad-the benefit from clarifying the procedural
system versus the constitutional questions raised by pursuing the
death penalty in non-death-causing treason cases-is under the
prosecutor's control. Charging the death penalty in a non-deathcausing treason case would raise serious constitutional questions, but
the prosecutor can tilt this factor entirely in favor of charging treason
by declining to seek the death penalty in cases where the accused
traitor has not caused death. Of course, if a prosecutor does elect to
seek the death penalty, then a jury or the judiciary could still serve as
a backstop and prevent the issuance of a death sentence.
Thus, to evaluate the current cases and the early stages of any
future treason cases, the main factor to consider is whether the
enemy in question, if it is a terrorist group, poses a state-like threat
sufficient to eliminate the danger of unjustifiably dignifying the
enemy. This inquiry is an objective one based on the strength,
proximity, power, and capabilities of the terrorist group. In a
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traditional war context, where the only variation from traditional
treason cases is that the enemy is a terrorist group, the potential
detriments from a treason prosecution will likely be outweighed by
the potential benefits, though the final analysis of all four pairs of
factors will depend on the particular cases that prosecutors charge.

V. CONCLUSION

Commentators who predicted that liberal democratic states had
outgrown treason prosecutions have been proven wrong. This Article
has endeavored to explain why the reasons offered for treason's
First, treason is not antiliberal
disappearance were incorrect.
because states, including the United States, have amended or
interpreted their treason laws to focus on the traitor's acts rather
than his internal beliefs. Second, treason is not as difficult to prove
in today's technological era because technology has enabled new,
easy-to-prove types of treason and has facilitated detection and
collection of evidence of traditional types of treason. Finally, the
occurrence of treason prosecutions may depend on the perceived
nature of the threat as existential, rather than just on the magnitude
of the threat.
Treason prosecutions offer both potential benefits and potential
detriments. The biggest danger is that the new expansion of treason
to encompass aid to non-state actors in a war-like context could open
the door for further expansion to non-state actors in non-war
contexts. The framework developed in Part IV clarifies that when
prosecutors consider bringing a treason charge, their major concern
should be whether the risk of dignifying a terrorist group as an
enemy is outweighed by benefits including increased societal
cohesion, deterrence of other treasons, and retribution. In a situation
where the relevant terrorist group is waging a state-like armed
conflict against the prosecuting state, then the risk of dignifying the
enemy is very low because the terrorist group has already proven its
own stature. In such instances, the benefits likely do outweigh the
harm. If a terrorist group does not pose a state-like threat, then the
potential costs of dignifying the group as an enemy and signaling
state weakness likely outweigh the potential benefits of a treason
charge, as compared with other available charges, particularly
Prosecutors and government officials should
material support.
scrupulously guard against expansion of treason to comparatively
weaker terrorist groups. Lawyers and statutory drafters have spent
centuries limiting treason to only the most serious and threatening of
enemies. Modern liberal democracies should not revert to expanding
its application.

